Recent Cases by unknown
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 35 
Issue 2 Spring 1970 Article 7 
Spring 1970 
Recent Cases 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Cases, 35 MO. L. REV. (1970) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Recent Cases
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST: A LINE IS DRAWN
Chimel v. California1
Police officers arrested petitioner Chimel inside his home for the
burglary of a coin shop. Without a search warrant anid over Chimel's
objection the officers thoroughly searched his house, including the attic,
garage, and workshop. Numerous coins, medals, and tokens were seized.
Although the arrest warrant was held to be invalid because the supporting
affidavit was set out in conclusory terms, the trial court found that the
officers had probable cause, hence the arrest was valid without a warrant.
The seized items were admitted over objection as evidence properly searched
for and seized incident to arrest. The Supreme Court of California af-
firmed the conviction.2
The United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
evidence used to convict Chimel had been seized in violation of the fourth
amendment. The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Stewart, at-
tempted to explain how far the Constitution will permit an officer to
search incident to arrest. Such a search can include only "a search of the
arrestee's person and the ... area from within which he might gain pos-
session of a weapon or destructible evidence." While the area beyond
the reaching radius of the arrestee can, as a general rule, be searched under
a search warrant,4 the Court stated that the scope of search incident to
arrest cannot be so broad:
No consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any
point of rational limitation, once the search is allowed to go
beyond the area from which the person arrested might obtain
weapons or evidentiary items. The only reasoned distinction is
one between a search of the person arrested and the area within
his reach on the one hand, and more extensive searches on the
other.5
The Court recognized that a warrantless search incident to an arrest
is proper in some instances, 6 and that if the cases of United States v. Rabino-
1. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
2. People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968).
3. Chimel v. California, supra note 1, at 768.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 766.
6. Id. at 762: See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Moody, 443
S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1969). More than inconvenience must be shown to justify not
getting a warrant. Chapman v. United States, 865 U.S. 610, 615 (1961); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
Although this note examines only the area limitations of a search incident to
arrest, there are other requirements that must be fulfilled:
1) The arrest must be legal; that is, either based upon an arrest war-
rant or prqbable cause that a crime has been committed. State v. Cuezze,
249 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. 1952).
2) The search must not be too remote from the arrest in time. State
v. Darabcsek, 412 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Mo. 1967).
(231)
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witz7 and Harris v. United States8 had been followed, the search in Chimel
would have been constitutional.9 Rabinowitz and Harris stood for the
proposition that the place of arrest can be searched incident to arrest-
"place" meaning the room or rooms over which the arrestee has dominion.
The Court rejected this standard and held that insofar as Rabinowitz and
Harris are in conflict with Chimel, they are no longer to be followed, 10
and that the area searched in Chimel was clearly beyond the constitutional
limitations." For reasons that are not stated, the Chimel Court declined
to expressly overrule United States v. Rabinowitz. In fact, Chimel uses
some of the same words found in Rabinowitz to express the new, more re-
stricted scope of search incident to arrest. But the duplication of phrases is
apparently intended only to convey a continuity of form, not substance. The
Chimel Court uses several phrases from Rabinowitz and redefines them to
convey a new meaning.
For example, both Chimel and Rabinowitz restrict the scope of search
to the area within the arrestee's "immediate control."' 2 While this term was
used in Rabinowitz to encompass the entire room of arrest, including the
contents of a desk, safe, and file cabinet, Chimel redefines "immediate
control" to mean the area within which an arrestee might get his hands
on a weapon or destructible evidence.' 3 In so doing, Chimel seems to have
succeeded in constructing a verbal rule which has been vainly sought by
some justices of the Court for two decades.
Prior to Chimel several justices felt that the area of search incident to
an arrest should not exceed the necessities of the arrest situation' 4-the
7. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
8. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
9. While admitting that the scope of search in both Harris and Rabinowitz
was more restricted than the case at bar, the Court noted:
The rationale that allowed the searches and seizures in Rabinowitz and
Harris would allow the searches and seizures in this case. No considera-
tion relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational
limitation, once the search is allowed to go beyind the area from which
the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969).
10. Id. at 768.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 763. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
13. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969).
14. "[W]e have refused to permit use of articles the seizure of which could
not be strictly tied to and justified by the exigencies which excused the warrantless
search." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
In the recent case of State v. Moody, 443 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1969), the Mis-
souri Supreme Court seems to have ignored this rule. Although recognizing that
a reason for search incident to arrest was "to prevent the possible destruction of
contraband or evidence relating to the offense for which the arrest was made," (em-
phasis added) the court upheld a drug possession conviction in which a packet of
drugs which the police found in a search of defendant's person incident to an
arrest for a traffic violation was admitted into evidence. The arresting officers
evidently went beyond a protective "pat-down" for weapons, which in itself might
have been going too far, since the crime was only a traffic violation. See Monica,
"Stop and Frisk": The Policeman's Friend, 34 Mo. L. RLv. 425 (1969). The court
indicated that so long as the arrest was not a mere pretext to search, a general
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"necessities" being the need to protect the arresting officer, the need to
prevent escape, and the need to prevent destruction of evidence. 1 A varie-
ty of terms were used in attempts to verbalize such a rule. Justice Frank-
furter used "immediate physical surroundings... extension of the person ' 16
and in a different case "projection of his person... immediate custody."'17
Justice Stewart has previously spoken in terms of "immediate vicinity,"' 8
and Justice Black, "immediate control."' 9
Attempts to create a one phrase rule have proven to be inadequate
because such phrases, standing alone, have been so vague that other judges
have been able to use the same words to allow searches incident to arrest
to be conducted in much larger areas. For example, one arrestee's "imme-
diate possession and control" was said to include a closet in the room of
arrest.2 0 In a Missouri case, an arrestee's "control" was said to extend to
a locked room adjacent to the room of arrest.21
One reason identical phrases have not led to identical results is that
such expressions as "custody," "possession," and "control" have been in-
tended by some judges as an expression of an actual physical ability to
hold or reach, while other judges have intended the same words to express
a broader property-law concept of control.2 2 Chimel made it clear that
"immediate control" shall mean the actual physical ability to hold or reach,
thus rejecting the broader definition of "control" as used in the law of
property.28
Just as it reused but redefined "immediate control," the Chimel Court
15. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
16. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
17. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 168 (1947) (dissenting opinion). 0
18. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 94
(1964).
19. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 867 (1964).
20. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
21. State v. Ciarelli, 416 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. 1967).
22. This misapplication of terms has previously been noted in several Supreme
Court cases: Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483, 488, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 940 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 266-67 (1960); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 164 (1947) (dis-
senting opinion).
23. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The rejection of the
proprietary definition of "control" in Chimel should have been anticipated in light
of the Court's notice in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), that property
concepts were not controlling in fourth amendment cases. "The premise that
property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been
discredited." Id. at 304.
The Court had previously divorced property rights from constitutional rights
on the question of "standing" to assert fourth amendment protections. See Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), where standing was held not to depend on
a personal possessory interest in the premises searched. In Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places." Id. at 351. And in Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), the
Court stated that "capacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment
depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the
area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from govern-
mental intrusion." Id. at 368. See Steps, Standing to Object to Unreasonable Search
and Seizure, 34 Mo. L. Ray. 575 (1969).
1970]
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borrowed other phrases from United States v. Rabinowit 24 and redefined
them to achieve a stricter scope of search. The Court agreed with Rabino-
witz that the constitutionality of a search incident to arrest depends on the
"reasonableness" of the search as determined by "the facts and circumstances
-the total atmosphere of the case." 25 However, the Court followed Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in that case, stating that the "reasonable-
ness" of a search must be determined in light of the reasons which under-
lie the fourth amendment, such as the history of the colonial evils and the
remedy which the framers intended.2 6 The fourth amendment was a re-
action to the British practice of making warrantless exploratory searches.
Therefore, if "the facts and circumstances" of a warrantless search show
that it was exploratory and not limited to meeting only judicially recognized
necessities, then the search is unreasonable and in violation of the fourth
amendment.27
A casual reading of Chimel might lead one to believe that the arresting
officer must confine his attentions at the scene of arrest to the area within
reach of the arrestee. This is not necessarily so. Chimel confines the scope
of search but not the scope of seizure. The Court has consistently allowed
an officer, while making a lawful arrest, to seize fruits and evidence of
crime, or contraband, which is in "plain sight."2 8 It has been recognized
that there is really no search involved in a "plain sight" seizure, and there-
fore Chimel does not apply.
Once an officer embarks on a search incident to arrest, there is un-
certainty as to exactly how far from the person of the arrestee he may
search.29 Chirnel rules that the search may not extend beyond the "area
from within which (the arrestee) might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence."3 0 Does this mean the arresting officer must not search
beyond the arm's length of the arrestee? If permitted to go beyond arm's
length, to what extent can the search be carried? A definitive answer must
await a United States Supreme Court decision. However, until a clarifying
opinion is handed down, decisions of state courts and lower federal courts
will set the standards for the permissible area of search under Chimel.
24. 339 U.s. 56 (1950).
25. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969). Since the "facts and circum-
stances" of any two cases are never exactly alike, the inclusion of this phrase gives
an easy out for those courts which would prefer not to follow the constitutional
interpretations of the United States Supreme Court.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 761. For a more thorough examination of the reason and purpose
underlying the fourth amendment, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
28. Trupiano v. United States, 384 U.S. 699, 704 (1948). See State v. Reask,
409 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. 1966), gambling paraphernalia in "plain view" of officers who
broke into apartment was proper subject of seizure; State v. Baines, 394 S.W.2d
312 (Mo. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 992 (1966), package of marijuana tossed to
the floor in "plain sight" of an officer was proper subject of seizure; State v. Eng-
berg, 377 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. 1964), stolen bottle of whiskey in "plain view" on
dresser in room of arrest was proper subject of seizure.
29. Recent cases which have found no search involved in a plain sight seizure
include: People v. Ellis, 251 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. App. 1969); Battles v. State, 459 P.2d
623 (Old. Crim. App. 1969); Fresneda v. State, 458 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1969).
30. 395 U.S. at 763.
[Vol. 35
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The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has construed Chimel to
allow a search beyond the arm's length of the arrestee and into the area
where an arrestee might grab a weapon by lunging.3 1 But the writer of a
dissenting opinion in a Rhode Island case persuasively argued that his col-
leagues (who did not mention Chimel in their majority opinion) were in
conflict with Chimel because they permitted a search of a car ten feet from
the point of arrest on the basis of a possibility that the arrestee could have
leaped to the car and grabbed a concealed weapon.3 2 In a California case,
it was stated that Chimel did not prevent a search of "articles customarily
carried by an arrested person .... '33 The court then listed which articles
would be subject to search incident to arrest:
In the category of such articles we include a woman's purse, a man's
wallet, a jacket, a hat, an overcoat, and a brief case in use at the
time of arrest, even though these articles may not be on the imme-
diate person of the arrestee at the moment of arrest.3 4
Another area left uncertain by Chimel is whether dangers from per-
sons other than the arrestee can serve to justify an expansion of the area
of search incident to arrest. Chimel, by its plain wording, prohibits a
search of other rooms of the premises as well as "closed or concealed areas"
within the room of arrest.3 5 But this does not necessarily mean that the
arresting officer must stand by helplessly until a bushwhacker in a closet
decides to make his move. The Court has never prohibited law officers from
protecting themselves from immediate dangers.3 6 It is reasonable to assume
that the Court would find a self-protective, cursory search for hidden
assailants to be within constitutional limits if the arresting officer has rea-
sonable grounds to believe his safety is threatened. In Terry v. Ohio3 the
Court recognized that a self protective search without a warrant could be
constitutional if the officer conducting the search could "point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts," would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that the
search was appropriate.3 8 Chimel makes it clear, however, that an arrest,
in and of itself, does not automatically give rise to reasonable fears of
danger sufficient to justify the search of an entire dwelling without a
warrant.
81. Scott v. State, 7 Md. App. 505, 256 A.2d 884 (1969).
82. State v. Moore, 256 A.2d 197 (R.I. 1969). If this type of reasoning were
to prevail, the search of the Chimel household could be upheld. After all, who
could foretell whether the police could have stopped Chimel from dashing into his
bedroom and emerging with a loaded pistol which might have been hidden under
the mattress. Id. at 205.
83. People v. Belvin, 80 Cal. Rptr. 382, 884 (1969).
84. Id.
85. 895 U.S. at 768.
86. "Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take
unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties." Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1,
28 (1968). In Terry, the Court took note in footnote 21, at 24, that 885 police
officers were killed and 9,118 injured in the course of 28,851 assaults on policemen
between 1960 and 1966.
87. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
38. Id. at 21.
1970]
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Chimel also makes it dear that an arrest does not automatically allow
an expanded search based upon fear of the destruction of evidence at the
hands of persons other than the arrestee. In his dissent in Chimel, Justice
White points out that since the arrestee's wife was present in the house at
the time of arrest, the police officers were justified in conducting as ex-
tensive a search as they did in order to prevent the wife from destroying
or concealing the stolen property during the time the officers would have
been out getting a search warrant.3 9 The majority opinion's silence on
this point, coupled with its plain language describing the maximum per-
missible area of search, left an inference that the need to guard against
possible destruction of evidence by a person other than arrestee cannot be
used as an excuse to expand the scope of search incident to arrest.
Although the Chimel opinion leaves little latitude for a police officer
to search incident to arrest beyond an arrestee's reach, there is no prohibi-
tion against an expanded search without a warrant if facts are known to
the arresting officer which would allow a search without warrant regard-
less of the fact that an arrest has been made. A purposeless, rummaging,
exploratory search of a premises incident to arrest is absolutely prohibited.
But searches without warrant of all or part of a premises may be allowed
where probable cause and "exigent circumstances" exist.40 An example of
such a situation is found in State v. Novak,41 where police officers con-
deducted a warrantless search after learning of specific and articulable facts
which would have permitted them to reasonably believe that a prompt,
warrantless search would be appropriate.4 2 Whether the United States
Supreme Court will recognize such an exception to the warrant require-
ment in order to protect evidence which, before Chimel, may have been
protected from concealment or destruction by a search incident to arrest,
must await another decision of the Court.
One question of immediate concern is whether Chimel is to be given
retroactive effect. In Von Cleef v. New Jersey43 and Shipley v. California,44
89. 395 U.S. at 775.
40. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
41. 428 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1968).
42. In Novak police officers came upon two or three men unloading boxesfrom a truck at 1:00 a.m. Upon seeing the officers, the men fled on foot. One of
the policemen trailed the men to an apartment. The other officer, by radio, re-
quested that a police cruiser be sent to the store designated by the labels on the
boxes remaining on the abandoned truck. Within ten minutes a burglary of the
store was confirmed. The officers at the apartment, getting no response to their
knocks, forced their way in, arrested the occupants, and searched the rooms. In
answer to the defendant's argument that one officer should have watched the apart-
ment while another left to get a warrant, the court observed:
Appellant's argument . . . overlooks the opportunity of defendant and
the other occupants to remove the Carp labels from the boxed merchan-
dise and commingle it with other merchandise in the apartment and there-
by destroy its identity as Carp's property and fruits of a specific burglary.
Id. at 593.
The Novak court also upheld the search of the entire apartment as incident
to arrest. This justification for the search appears to be directly in conflict with
Chimel and is probably no longer controlling in Missouri.
43. 395 U.S. 814 (1969).
44. 395 U.S. 818 (1969).
[Vol. 35
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both dealing with searches incident to arrest and both handed down the
same day as Chimel, the Court declined to rule whether Chimel should be
given retroactive effect. In his concurring opinion in Von Cleef, Justice
Harlan argued that Chimel should be applied to cases pending on appeal.45
The Supreme Court of Alaska has applied Chimel to cases which were
pending on direct review on July 23, 1969, the date of the Chimel deci-
sion.46 However, the Supreme Court of California 47 and the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland 4s have looked to standards used by the United
States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker49 to determine whether an
opinion dealing with criminal procedure should be given purely prospective
effect. The persuasive conclusions of both. state courts were that Chimel
should be given purely prospective effect, that is, it shall not apply to
searches made prior to July 23, 1969. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York has also ruled that Chimel shall be
applied purely prospectively.5 0
Because the fourth amendment search and seizure requirements have
been "incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment5 1 and have been en-
forced by the "exclusionary rule," 52 guidelines set down in Chimel are
binding on the fifty states. Chimel will have a particularly disruptive ef-
fect on law enforcement in Missouri, because the scope of search and the
items subject to seizure are specifically delimited by statute.53 Even before
Chimel the statutory laws on search and seizure were, at best, inconsistent
and incomplete. For example, Section 301.390, RSMo 1959, authorizes an
officer to seize any motor vehicle, trailer, or motor vehicle tire from
which the serial number has been removed. Even though the possession
of such property is illegal, there is no authorization to search for such
items.
But the most glaring omission is the absence of a statute authorizing
the issuance of a warrant to search for evidence or instrumentalities of
crime. Missouri law enforcement officers, in the past, have relied on
searches incident to arrest to conduct such searches not authorized by
statute. In fact, the Missouri Supreme Court went so far as to suggest
that such a method be used to locate a murder weapon.5 4 Although
45. 395 U.S. at 817.
46. Fresneda v. State, 458 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1969).
47. People v. Edwards, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
48. Scott v. State, 7 Md. App. 505, 256 A.2d 384 (1969).
49. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
50. People ex rel. Muhammad v. Mancusi, 301 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
51. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Justice Harlan, just as he had
done in so many "incorporation" cases, reminds the reader that his concurrence
in Chimel is based on independent due process-fundamental rights grounds-and
not on a belief that the fourth amendment, or any other part of the Bill of Rights,
should be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and applied to the states.
52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule, which pro-
hibits the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a criminal prosecution,
was adopted in Missouri in State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100 (1924), and
as now embodied in Mo. R. Cam. P. 33.03.
53. §§ 542.260-.420, RSMo 1959.
54. In State v. Wright, 336 Mo. 135, 77 S.W.2d 459 (1934), the court reversed
a murder conviction even though a gun and a coin bag linking defendant to the
crime had been obtained in a search of defendant's home made with a valid war-
1970]
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Chimel would seem to require that the Missouri courts no longer allow
state police officers to conduct extensive exploratory searches incident
to arrest, the true impact of the case is uncertain, for there is reason to be-
lieve that the Supreme Court of Missouri will attempt to lessen the ef-
fect of Chimel by reading it as narrowly as possible.55
Because of Chimel, revision of the Missouri search warrant statutes
is essential. The scope of search should be expanded to include such
items as burglar tools, weapons, and "mere" evidence.56 Warrant pro-
cedures should also be modernized. The written affidavit, 57 with the
requirement that it be read by the magistrate,58 and the hand carried
warrant 59 may be unnecessarily time consuming in this day of instanta-
neous communication.60
In the past, the Supreme Court of the United States has found it
difficult to develop a rule governing the scope of search incident to ar-
rest which strikes a proper balance between the individual's interest in
privacy and the public's interest in effective law enforcement, and which
at the same time conforms to the fourth amendment's standard of reason-
ableness. The number of times the Court has changed direction on the
rant. The warrant, specifying stolen property as the object, was shown to have
been requested as a subterfuge to search for the gun and other evidence. The court
noted that the proper way to search for these items would have been to arrest
defendant while he was at home. Id. at 143, 77 S.W.2d at 463.
55. In State v. Moody, 443 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1969), the first Missouri case to
cite Chimel (merely to support the rule that a search without a warrant may be
made incident to arrest), the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the admission of evi-
dence obtained in a search of the arrestee's person incident to arrest, the arrest
being for a traffic violation. This ruling appears to be inconsistent with the rea-
soning of the Terry, Sibron, and Chimel cases. The Moody court all but confesses
that its decision was based on policy, not precedent.
We believe that police officers, while in the performance of their official
duties, are entitled to all the safety and protection we can give them within
constitutional limitations.
Id. at 804. While the statement taken alone is innocuous, the context of its delivery
indicates that the Missouri court will allow relatively more thorough searches in
the interest of an officer's safety.
56. Constitutional doubts may formerly have prevented statutory authoriza-
tion of search warrants for evidence. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154
(1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932). But see Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), where the Court said: "Nothing in the language of
the Fourth Amendment supports the distinction between 'mere evidence' and in-
strumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband." 387 U.S. at 301.
A search incident to arrest for "mere evidence" was specifically approved in
Missouri in State v. Glenn, 431 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. 1968), which cites Warden v.
Hayden.
57. Mo. CONST., art. I, § 15; Mo. R. Cm. P. 33.01 (a). There is no such
requirement in the United States Constitution.
58. See State v. McCowan, 331 Mo. 1214, 56 S.W.2d 410 (1932).
59. Mo. . CRIM. P. 33.02 requires that a copy of the warrant be left at the
place where property is seized.
60. Just as law enforcement officers now exchange information instantane-
ously by radio and telephone, judges could acquire the information necessary for
the issuance of a warrant and give the warrant to the officer on the scene using the
same channels of communication. Such information could be exchanged orally,
with an audio recorder tape to preserve the record; or facsimile documents could
be sent and received by radio or wire on portable fax transceivers.
[Vol. 35
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issue of scope of search incident to arrest indicates the difficulty of arriv-
ing at a permanently workable balance.61 Although Chimel is the most
recent in a series of conflicting cases, it should not be read as merely
another deviation. Chimel comes closer than any previous case to achiev-
ing the long recognized intent of the fourth amendment that, except
where a warrantless search is necessary to meet a particular emergency,
a judge of the law, not an enforcer of the law, should decide whether and
in what manner the privacy of the citizen shall be violated by a police
intrusion.62
DAIR C. DoEmRoFF
EXTENSION OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY TO
A LAND DEVELOPER
Avner v. Longridge Estates'
Avner purchased property on a hillside in the Santa Monica Moun-
tains, Los Angeles County, in 1960 from a vendor who had built a house
on the tract. The vendor had previously purchased the property from
Longridge Estates, owner of a larger tract of land which it had developed
into residential lots. Portions of the rear slope of the lot failed, first in
February, 1962, and again in November, 1965. The lot pad also settled
"allegedly due to the decomposition of organic matter and insufficient
compaction at the time of the lot preparation. '" 2 Plaintiff, Avner, brought
actions based, inter alia, on strict liability against Longridge Estates, as
well as against the general engineer and the soil engineer who prepared
the lot, claiming improper filling and grading. The trial court sustained
a demurrer to plaintiff's cause of action based on strict liability3 because
"there is no doctrine of strict liability as to the manufacture of residential
lots."4 The Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed the judgment, in-
structing the trial court to overrule the general demurrers. The court
stated, "[W]e conclude that the manufacturer of a lot may be held
strictly liable in tort for damages suffered by the owner as a proximate
result of any defects in the manufacturing process."5
61. Justice White, joined by Justice Black, gives as one of his main reasons
for dissent the "untimely fifth" switch that Chimel makes in the law of search
incident to arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 770-72 (1969).
62. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914).
1. - Cal. App. 2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
2. Id. at -, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 635.3. Demurrers to six of plaintiff's eight causes of action were also sustained
on the further ground that the three-year statute of limitations had run. Avner v.
Longridge Estates, - Cal. App. 2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). The subject
matter of this note deals solely with the cause of action of strict liability in tort.
4. Avner v. Longridge Estate, - Cal. App. 2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635(1969). The court was quoting the trial court.
5. Id. at -, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
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Application of the theory of strict liability to the field of products
liability appeared as early as 1944 in Chief Justice (then Justice) Tray-
nor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.6 Nineteen
years later, with Justice Traynor again writing the majority opinion, the
principle of strict liability was firmly established as the law in California
in the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.7 Greenman was
followed in 1964 by Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,8 which extended
strict liability to make it clear "that the manufacturer of a completed
product cannot escape [liability] . .. by proving that the manufacturer
of a component part or a dealer was responsible for the defect." 9
Turning from sellers of goods to sellers of real property, the California
courts looked to the Supreme Court of New Jersey which had in 1965
applied strict liability to the builder-vendor of a mass-produced home.10
Basing its holding (in part) on that of the New Jersey case, 11 the California
Court of Appeal in 1969 moved closer to the present position, by im-
posing strict liability on a builder vendor of a mass-produced home in
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.12 The Kriegler decision placed California
6. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
7. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963). Plain-
tiff was injured by a power tool given to him by his wife. An action against the
retailer and the manufacturer resulted in judgment for the retailer against plain-
tiff, and for plaintiff against the manufacturer. Plaintiff and the manufacturer ap-
pealed, and the Supreme Court of California held:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.
The court affirmed the judgment for the defendant retailer.
8. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964). Plaintiff brought
an action against both the manufacturer and dealer of an automobile for injuries
resulting from an accident caused by defects in the braking system.
9. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMiAN, PRODuCrs LrAILrrY, 3-175 (1966). Frumer
and Friedman further state, "Moreover, under Vandermark, the retailer of a de-
fective product, as well as the manufacturer, is strictly liable in tort," Ibid. For
an in-depth discussion of the development of the law of products liability in Cali-
fornia, see Lascher, Strict Liability In Tort For Defective Products: The Road To
and Past Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L. Ruv. 30 (1965).
10. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Plaintiff
brought an action against a builder-vendor of a mass produced home for injuries
sustained by his child as a result of excessively hot water from a defective faucet.
Plaintiffs not only advanced a cause of action based on strict liability, but on a
negligence theory as well. The court reversed a judgment for defendant builder-
vendor and remanded for a new trial. The holding was based in part on two prior
New Jersey cases: Santor v. A. and M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
305 (1965) (defective carpeting); and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (defective automobile). The court could find "no
meaningful distinctions" to be made between the sale of mass produced homes and
the sale of mass produced automobiles and, therefore, "the warranty and strict
liability principles.., should be carried over into the field of realty.. . ." Schipper
v. Levitt, supra at 90, 207 A.2d at 325 (1965).
11. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
12. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969). Plaintiff's predecessor
bought one of over 4,000 mass produced homes constructed by defendant. A de-
cision based on strict liability in tort was upheld for plaintiff as a result of damage
sustained due to defective steel tubing in a radiant heating system.
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on the verge of the application of strict liability to the developer of a
mass-produced residential lot in Avner v. Longridge Estates.18
While Missouri courts have not yet taken a position comparable to
that of California in Avner, products liability plaintiffs can now recover,
at least for personal injury, on a cause of action based solely in tort on
a theory of strict liability.14 The development of the Missouri decisions
on this point appeared in two stages. From 193615 to 196316 Missouri
courts wrestled with the problem of a plaintiff's recovery from a manufac-
turer, absent the traditional requirement of privity of contract. 17 A
shorter stage of development extended from the 1963 rejection of the
requirement of privity to a dear, unequivocal adoption of the Restate-
ment (Second) position regarding strict liability 8 in 1969.19
13. - Cal. App. 2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). The principle in Avner
represents merely a logical extension of Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., supra
note 12.
We are unable to distinguish the obligation of a builder to a purchaser
for a defective radiant heating system installed in a cement floor slab...
from the obligation of a manufacturer of a lot to a purchaser for de-
fective subsurface conditions resulting from improper filling and grading
that cause instability. Avner v. Longridge Estates, supra at -, 77 Cal.
Rptr. at 639.
14. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
15. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S.W.2d 445 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936). Plaintiff recovered a judgment without privity
of contract for injuries sustained from a bottle of soft drink containing a mouse.
The court found an implied warranty and affirmed the judgment. See also Wil-
liams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955) (soft drink
containing two pieces of foreign matter); Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d
150 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942) (steel particles in a loaf of bread); Carter v. St. Louis
Dairy Co., 139 S.W.2d 1025 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940) (glass in buttermilk); Mc-
Nicholas v. Continental Baking Co., 112 S.W.2d 849 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938) (glass
in a loaf of bread); Namela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 104 S.W.2d 773 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1937) (bugs in a bottle).
16. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
Defendant's gas stove, due to a malfunctioning valve, caused a fire which de-
stroyed plaintiff's house and contents. Plaintiff recovered without privity.
17. The full development of Missouri law from Madouros to Morrow has
been traced and analyzed by several writers. See, e.g., Krauskopf, Products Liability,
32 Mo. L. Rv. 459, 464-68 (1967); Lauer, Sales Warranties Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 Mo. L. Rv. 259, 273-74, 277-79 (1965); Roberts, Implied
Warranties-the Privity Rule and Strict Liability-The Non-Food Cases, 27 Mo. L.
REv. 194 (1962). Smith, Product Liability-Missouri-Implied Warranty-The End
of Privity, 29 Mo. L. REv. 217, 218-22 (1964).
18. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), or TORTS § 402 (A) (1965):(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer in the condi-
tion in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
19. Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
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In the latter stage, reference to the Restatement position came ini-
tially in 1966 in the case of Hacker v. Rector.20 The following year, the
language of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Williams v. Ford Motor
Co.21 led one writer to note that Williams was "the Missouri decision that
can be fairly interpreted as an express adoption of the Restatement sec-
tion 402(A)." 22 However, because the cause of action in Williams was for
breach of an implied warranty of fitness, and the language of the court
was partially couched in those terms, there was some question as to the
exact state of Missouri law in spite of the persuasive authority that
Williams adopted the Restatement position.23
All doubt was removed in 1969, however, in Keener v. Dayton Electric
Manufacturing Co.,24 involving an action for wrongful death after plain-
tiff's husband was electrocuted lifting a sump pump from a basement
floor while standing in ankle deep water. Plaintiff's petition alleged that
the pump was defective by reason of not being equipped with a ground
wire or an overload protector. Though the case was reversed and re-
manded for new trial due to an improper jury instruction, the court's
opinion adopted the Restatement position explicitly along with clear
and substantial reasons for its adoption.25 Missouri is now dearly a strict
liability state.26
A comparison of present Missouri products liability law with that
of California leads to an observation concerning the path of products
liability development in Missouri since 1963. The pattern of California
law since Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc.,27 through Kriegler v.
20. Hacker v. Rector, 250 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo. 1966). Plaintiffs, who
were "guest passengers" in one defendant's car, brought an action against the other
defendant, manufacturer of an allegedly defective tire. The District Court over-
ruled a motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of privity between plaintiffs and
manufacturer. The court reached the conclusion that, "the Morrow case obviously
adopted the rationale of the rule stated in Section 402(A), of the Restatement,
Second Torts, although it did not do so expressly." Id. at 301.
21. 411 S.W.2d 443 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966). Plaintiff was injured in a car
manufactured by defendant which had allegedly defective power steering.
22. Krauskopf, supra note 17, at 468-69.
23. Id.
24. 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
25. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., supra note 24, at 364, states:(1) "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers and
sellers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Greeman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 377 P.2d
897, 901.
(2) "The main advantage to Missouri courts in fully adopting the Restate-
ment theory could be release from the shackles of warranty language."Krauskopf, Products Liability, 32 Mo. L. R.ay. 459, 469.
(3) "It is essential now that the Bench and Bar of Missouri be given some
sense of direction in products liability cases."
26. "[L]iability in products liability cases is no longer governed by the law
of contract warranties, but by the law of strict liability in tort." Keener v. Dayton
Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364-65 (Mo. 1965). The court here quoted Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 377
P.2d 897, 901 (1963).
27. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
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Eichler Homes Inc.28 and Avner v. Longridge Estates29 has been an exten-
tion of the principle of strict liability in tort into fields heretofore un-
touched by products liability cases.3 0 On the other hand, Missouri courts
since the clear rejection of the privity requirement in Morrow have been
concerned with articulation of the grounds for recovery which finally
culminated in Keener. This seems to place Missouri presently in a position
comparable to that of California following Greenman.
Another comparison to be noted between the law of Missouri and
California lies in the type of recovery which has been allowed by the
two states. California has allowed a cause of action for damage solely to
the defective product itself without personal injury or damage to other
property,31 while Missouri as yet has not. The recent Missouri cases
leading up to and including Keener have been personal injury cases,8 2
and while recoveries for damage to property have been allowed since
1959, 3 no case has yet granted relief when the article merely destroys
itself. If such a case should arise, Missouri courts would be faced with
a decision as to just what interpretation should be given when applying
Restatement 402(A) now that it has been adopted. This is not to say
that Missouri has not kept pace with the development of products liabil-
ity law,3 4 but merely places California in the forefront as far as recoveries
by plaintiffs are concerned. 35
After noting Missouri's express adoption of strict liability and Cal-
28. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
29. - Cal. App. 2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
30. States other than California have allowed recoveries similar to that in
Kriegler. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965);
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968), strict liability applied under an
implied warranty of fitness to allow recovery for damages resulting from a fire in
a defective fireplace; Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 83 So. Dak. 57,
154 N.W.2d 803 (1967), where an exception to caveat emptor was made to apply
an implied warranty theory for sale of a new home by a builder-vendor; Bethlahmy
v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966), and Carpenter v. Donohue, 154 Colo.
78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964), implied warranty said to exist, and a departure was made
from caveat emptor. The action in Carpenter was also based on express warranties
and fraud, however.
It should be noted that none of the cases cited above, except Schipper and
Humber, mention strict liability though they reach essentially the same result
through the implied warranty language. It should be further noted that in all the
above cases except Schipper, privity existed between plaintiff and defendant. Thus,
aside from the New Jersey decision in Schipper and California in Kriegler, no
state has yet applied strict liability in tort to a builder-vendor of real property,
without the requirement of privity. Further, no state except California has yet
applied strict liability to a developer of the land itself in a products liability case.
31. Avner v. Longridge Estates, - Cal. App. 2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
32. Hacker v. Rector, 250 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Williams v. Ford
Motor Co., 411 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. 1966); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445
S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
33. Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
Defendant's manufactured fish food allegedly caused death to plaintiff's trout. It
was held that defendants impliedly warranted the fitness of the product as a "com-
plete" fish food.
34. "To adopt the Restatement position is to be in the forefront of surging
legal change." Krauskopf, supra note 17, at 469.
35. See note 30, supra.
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ifornia's further extension of the concept, one is led to ask what would
be necessary to place Missouri law where California law is today. In
other words, what would Missouri have to do in order to apply strict
liability in tort to a developer of mass-produced lots? Initially, Missouri
would have to extend strict liability to a builder-vendor of mass-produced
homes.3 6 This presents some major hurdles. There exists fifty-three years
of contrary Missouri authority37 on this point which has never been ques-
tioned.38 In addition, the doctrine of caveat emptor appears to stand
directly in the path of recovery in this area. The California courts seem
to have resolved the problem, basing the Kriegler decision on Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc.3 9 which stated:
Caveat emptor developed when the buyer and seller were in an
equal bargaining position and they could readily be expected toprotect themselves in he dee . Bu ers of mass produc d develop.
ment homes are not on an equal footing with the builder vendors
and are no more able to protect themselves in the deed than are
automobile purchasers in a position to protect themselves 
i  th
bill of sale.4 0
Missouri courts on the other hand have given no indication that
caveat emptor would fail to be a bar in the instance of a seller of mass-
produced homes. Therefore, it is open to question whether a Missouri
court would dismiss the long established rules, indicated above, so sum-
marily. It is to be noted, however, that the adoption of the Restatement
position in Keener shows Missouri's willingness to take a progressive
approach to products liability when good reason for it can be shown.
Therefore, it seems possible that when, and if, the pgint is raised, andif the application of strict liability to the builder (manufacturer) vendor
of mass-produced real property seems advisable, the courts will so act.Once this is done, applying strict liability in tort in the Avner situation
would be easy.
The relative ease or difficulty with which Missouri courts might
move to the Avner position leads to the more basic question of whether
Missouri should adopt such a position.
Since the application of strict liability to the developer of mass-
36. Kriegler v• Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Gal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. R ptr. 749
pru Flannery v. St. Louis Architectural Iron Co., 194 Mo. App. 555, 185 S.W.
760 (St. L. Ct. App. 1916). Recovery was denied for collapse of a garage roof under
heavy snow accumulation due to a latent defect in steel support rods. The
Flannery case is mentioned in Krauskopf, Products Liability, 8 Mo. L. Rv. 24,
80 (1968). Professor Krauskopf notes the Schipper decision, and indicates that the
application of the rule therein "in Missouri would require overruling or distin-
guishing annery v. St. Louis Architectural Iron Co."-
88. Whaley v. Milton Const. Supply Co., 241 S.W.2d 28 (St. L. Mo. App.
1951). The rule set forth in lannery, supra note 37, that a builder was only bound
to perform in a workmanlike manner, and that no warranty of fitness was implied,
was affirmed. Plaintiff brought an action against a builder-vendor of a mass pro-
duced home for various defects in the house.
39. 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1955).
40. Id. at 91-92, 207 A.2d at 326.
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produced lot itself is not a far reaching extension beyond application of
the principle to real property in the first place (i.e. to the builder vendor
of mass produced home),41 the basic question really is, should Missouri
apply strict liability to the sale of manufactured, mass-produced real prop-
erty? A good argument can be made for an affirmative answer viewed in the
light of Kriegler v. Eichler Homes Inc.4 2 As previously noted, the California
court justified its holding and rejection of caveat emptor on the same basis
as did the New Jersey court in Schipper. Indeed both courts justified the
application of strict liability to the manufacturer of real property in the
same manner as it has been reasoned that the manufacturer of chattel
should be held accountable for defects in his products.43 In the limited
situation involving a developer manufacturer of real property, Restatement
402(A) liability seems warranted. This is definitely not meant even to
suggest a total rejection of caveat emptor in the sale of real property.
Nevertheless, in the narrow scope of Schipper, Kriegler, and Avner, where
the buyer and seller "are not on equal footing,"'4 4 and adequate inspection
is not available to the buyer,45 the holding, if so limited, seems justified.
Thus, if the aforementioned hurdles can be overcome in the proper factual
situation, Missouri could justifiably adopt the California position of
Kriegler and Avner, further expanding upon its adoption of the Restate-
ment position.
GARY S. DYER
41. See footnote 13 supra.
42. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
43. See footnote 10 supra, and text.
44. See text at footnote 40 supra. See also Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44
N.J. 70, 90-92, 207 A.2d 314, 325-26 (1965); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269
Cal. App. 2d 224, 228, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752-53 (1969), citing Schipper; Avner v.
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CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: MISSOURI AGAIN FAILS
TO MEET CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler'
In 1967 the Missouri Legislature made its third attempt in seven
years to draw up a congressional redistricting plan that would be consti-
tutionally permissible.2 The plan divided the state into ten congressional
districts. The districts created by the 1967 Act varied from 13,542 above
an ideal equal district to 12,260 below it. The most populous district was
3.13% above mathematical equality and the least populous district was
2.83% below the ideal.3 On December 29, 1967, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Missouri held that the 1967 Mis-
souri Congressional Redistricting Act did not comply with article I,
section 2, of the United States Constitution4 and was therefore void. 5
The Supreme Court affirmed in a 6-3 decision, holding that Missouri's
ten congressional districts did not satisfy the "as nearly as practicable"
constitutional standard for population apportionment and that Missouri
had no legally acceptable justification for the population variances among
the districts.0
Until 1962, there was no remedy in the federal courts for the often
times gross inequalities that existed between populations of various state
1. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
2. §§ 128.202-.305, RSMo 1967 Supp.
3. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 529 (1969). The redistricting ef-
fected by the 1967 Act, based on a population of 4,319,813 according to the 1960
census, is as follows:
% Variation
District No. Population From Ideal
one 439,746 + 1.8
two 436,448 + 1.03
three 436,099 - .95
four 419,721 - 2.84
five 431,178 - .19
six 422,238 - 2.26
seven 436,769 + 1.11
eight 445,523 + 3.13
nine 428,223 - .87
ten 423,868 - 1.88
Ideal population per district .......................... 431,981
Average variation from ideal ......................... 1.6%
Ratio of largest to smallest district ..................... 1.06 to 1
Number of districts within 1.88% of ideal .............. 7
Population difference between largest and smallest
district .......................................... 25,802
4. Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution states:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors
in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the
most numerous branch of the State Legislature.
5. Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 279 F. Supp. 952 (1967).
6. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
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legislative or congressional districts. In almost every state the difference
between the number of persons in the least populous district and the
most populous district was quite significant.7 The basis of the federal
courts' failure to consider reapportionment cases was a rationale exempli-
fied in Colegrove v. Greens where Justice Frankfurter stated, "[C]ourts
ought not to enter this political thicket." 9
However, in March 1962 in the landmark case of Baker v. Carr'°
the Supreme Court held that federal courts had jurisdiction to determine
whether state legislative apportionments violated the fourteenth amend-
ment. Since Baker there has been a steady stream of decisions which have
expanded and developed the rationale enunciated in that decision. For
example, in 1963 the Supreme Court held that Georgia's county-unit
system used in electing statewide officials violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1 This marked the first time the
federal courts had invalidated a state law because of a conflict with the
"one man-one vote" ideal.12 Then in 1964, in Wesberry v. Sanders,'8
the Court held that the Constitutional mandate that representatives be
chosen "by the People of the several states '14 meant:
[A]s nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another's .... To say that a
vote is worth more in one district than in another would. .. run
counter to our fundamental idea of democratic government .... 15
Four months after Wesberry, reapportionment decisions dealing with
the legislatures of fifteen states were handed down by the Supreme Court
within a one week period.' 6 In one of these decisions, Reynolds v. Sims,17
7. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1964) (app. to the opinion of
Justice Harlan).
8. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
9. Id. at 556.
10. 869 U.S. 186 (1962).
11. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
12. R. DixoN, DraocRaxrc REPRESENTATION-RAPPOTiONAENT IN LAW AND
PoLrr-cs 172 (1968), states that "in its most elemental connotation, 'the one man-
one vote' idea denotes simply the principle of majority rule in the filling of a given
office in a given constituency."
13. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
14. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 2.
15. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
16. The fifteen states and respective cases are: Alabama, Reynolds v. Sims,
Vann v. Baggett, McConnell v. Baggett, 877 U.S. 588 (1964); New York, WMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland, Maryland Comm. for Fair Rep-
resentation v. Tawes, 877 U.S. 656 (1964); Virginia, Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678(1964); Delaware, Roman v. Sincock, 877 U.S. 695 (1964); Colorado, Lucas v. Colo-
rado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Michigan, Beadle v. Scholle, 877 U.S.
990 (1964), and Marshall v. Hare, 878 U.S. 561 (1964); Washington, Meyers v.
Thigpen, 878 U.S. 554 (1964); Oklahoma, Williams v. Moss, 878 U.S. 558 (1964);
Illinois, Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560 (1964); Idaho, Hearne v. Smylie, 878
U.S. 568 (1964); Connecticut, Pinney v. Buttemvorth, 878 U.S. 564 (1964); Florida,
Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964); Ohio, Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556 (1964);
Iowa, Hill v. Davis, 878 U.S. 565 (1964).
17. 377 U.S. 583 (1964).
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the Court speaking through Chief Justice Warren undertook to enunciate
certain standards against which apportionment laws would henceforth
be tested. It was stated that there must be "substantial equality of popu-
lation among the various districts"' 8 and the districts must be "as nearly
of equal population as is practicable."' 9
Despite the vagueness of the standards, lower courts moved quickly
to implement the pronouncements of the Supreme Court while most
states immediately began to draw up legislation that would comply with
the standards set down in Wesberry and Reynolds. However, in most
cases the states' attempts to comply with the "one man-one vote" ideal
have not succeeded. Much of the blame for this must ultimately lie with
the Supreme Court's failure to set definite standards by which the states
could be guided. Missouri's futile attempts since 1960 to meet the "one
man-one vote" ideal have been illustrative of this point.
In 1961, following the 1960 population census which reduced Mis-
souri's number of Congressional representatives from 11 to 10, the state
legislature divided the state into ten congressional districts20 as required
by the Missouri State Constitution.21 On January 4, 1965, the Federal
District Court for the Western District of Missouri ruled that the 1961
Missouri Congressional Redistricting Act was unconstitutional because of
its failure to comply with the standards set forth in Reynolds and Wes-
berry.22 The district court, however, withheld judicial action "until
the Legislature of the State of Missouri has once more had an oppor-
tunity to deal with the problem."23 In accordance with this decision, the
Seventy-third General Assembly enacted the 1965 Congressional Redistrict-
ing Act.2 4 This Act was likewise held to be constitutionally invalid,25
and on January 9, 1967 this judgment was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.20 Following this decision, the Seventy-fourth General Assembly
of Missouri once again attempted to meet the constitutional requirements
and enacted the statute2 7 held unconstitutional by the district court 2s
and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick.2 9
18. Id. at 559.
19. Id. at 577.
20. Mo. Laws 1961, at 602, § 1.
21. Mo. CoNsT. art. 3, § 45, provides:
When the number of representatives to which the state is entitled in the
house of the congress of the United States under the census of 1950 and
each census thereafter is certified to the governor, the general assembly
shall by law divide the state into districts corresponding with the number
of representatives which it is entitled, which districts shall be composed
of contiguous territory as compact and as nearly equal in population as
may be.
22. Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 238 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Mo.
1965).
23. Id. at 191.
24. §§ 128.202-.305, RSMo 1965 Supp.
25, Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 257 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Mo.
1966). However, the district court permitted the 1966 congressional elections to
be conducted under the constitutionally void 1965 Act.
26, Kirkparick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967).
27. §§ 128.202-.305, RSMo 1967 Supp.
28. Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 279 F. Supp. 952 (1967).
29. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
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Missouri made two primary arguments in Kirkpatrick in defense of
the 1967 Act. The first was that the variances between the districts
was so small as to be de minimis,3o and therefore the "as nearly as prac-
ticable" standard was satisfied. Second, and in the alternative, Missouri
argued that any variances could be justified by such considerations as:
maintaining compactness and regularity of district lines; drawing district
lines to correspond with county lines; historical factors; projection of
population movements within the state; and the presence of transient
or nonvoting military personnel and college students within the proposed
districts. Missouri further argued that the reapportionment law was the
most equitable bill that political compromise between different interest
groups in the Missouri Legislature would allow.31
In response to these arguments, the Court clearly indicated that
Missouri and other states had failed to grasp the Wesberry and Reynolds
standards stating, "We are required in this case to elucidate the 'as nearly
as practicable' standard."3 2 The Court then stated that there is no fixed
numerical standards33 nor arbitrary cut off points; rather, each state
must make a "good-faith effort" to achieve precise mathematical equal-
ity.3 4 The Court also recognized that the extent to which this equality
can be achieved may vary from state to state and from district to district.
However, if a state has not made a "good-faith effort" to achieve mathe-
matical equality, any variance, no matter how small, must be justified.
Applying this reasoning to the Kirkpatrick situation, the Court rejected
Missouri's de minimis argument3 5 concluding that Missouri had failed
to make a "good-faith effort" to avoid population variances.3 6
Having previously held that the burden is on the state to prove that
variances are justified,3 7 the Supreme Court then dealt with the question
of whether Missouri had met this burden. The Court rejected Missouri's
30. See note 8 supra.
31. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 349 U.S. 533 (1969).
32. Id. at 530.
33. Id. at 531. It was stated in Missouri's appellant brief at page 11 that
some Missouri legislators, when drawing up the 1967 Act, felt if they achieved a
2 percent level of variance they would meet the standard.
34. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
35. The Supreme Court in January, 1967, decided the Florida case of Swarm
v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1966), in which the Court stated, "De minimis deviations
are unavoidable ... " The language was the basis for Missouri's de minimis
argument which was rejected in Kirkpatrick. It should be noted that after Swann
the Supreme Court never again stated that de minimis deviations were unavoid-
able.
36. The facts indicated that district make-up much closer to the ideal of
population equality had been proposed in earlier versions of the bill but rejected
by the 1967 Missouri legislature.
37. See Swann v. Adams, 885 U.S. 440, 445 (1967). The Supreme Court in
Kirkpatrick puts special emphasis on the fact that the burden is on the states
to justify their particular apportionment plans. This is quite significant because
it makes the states' task of drawing up a workable plan even more difficult.
Furthermore, under the new "equal numbers" constitutional standard for appor-
tionment found in Kirkpatrick any plan would be open to attack merely by show-
ing a more equal plan would be possible. There is thus no presumption in favor
of the validity of a state's apportionment plan.
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argument that population variances were necessary to avoid fragmenting
areas with distinct economic and social interests on the basis that "[n]either
history alone, nor economics or other sorts of group interests, are per-
missible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based
representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes." 38
Missouri's arguments that deviations from equality were the result of
an attempt to keep the districts geographically compact3 9 by drawing
lines along existing county or municipal lines were similarly discarded.
The Court also refused to accept the argument that the 1967 Act was
the best possible compromise among the Missouri legislators following
the district court's finding that "the rule is one of 'practicability' rather
than political 'practicality.' "40 In discarding Missouri's contention that
certain population variances resulted from the legislature's attempt to
take into account large numbers of non-voting college students and
military personnel in order to base reapportionment on eligible voter
population rather than total population, the Court, while assuming this
technique to be valid, stated that Missouri had made no "good-faith effort"
to ascertain eligible voter population.
In regard to Missouri's contention that variations in some of its dis-
tricts resulted from attempts to project population shifts during the ten
years between population censuses, the Court, although rejecting this
argument in the Missouri situation, stated that "[w]here these shifts can
be predicted with a high degree of accuracy, states that are redistricting,
may properly consider them."41 The Court made it dear, however, that
this was not meant to be a loophole for the states, and population trends
must be "thoroughly documented and applied throughout the state in
a systematic, not an ad hoc, manner."42
By rejecting all of Missouri's justifications, the Court gives the dis-
tinct impression that it will be a rare case in which a state can justify
any deviation from exact numerical equality among districts. 48 The Court
seems to have abandoned its previous approach of allowing some de-
38. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-80 (1964). See also Davis v. Mann, 377
U.S. 678, 692 (1964).
39. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964).
40. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533 (1969).
41. 394 U.S. 526, 535.
42. Id.
43. In Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969), the companion case to
Kirkpatrick, the Supreme Court reversed the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York which had sustained the validity of New York's
1968 congressional districting statute. The Court, relying exclusively on its opinion
in Kirkpatrick, held that New York had failed to make a good faith effort to
achieve equal numbers in each district. New York in its re-districting plan sought
to treat seven sections of the state as homogeneous regions and to divide each of
these regions into congressional districts of equal population. Thirty-one of
New York's 41 congressional districts were drawn up under this plan. The re-
maining ten districts were constructed by grouping whole counties together. These
ten districts were of equal population. However, when compared with the other
thirty-one districts these districts did not meet the standard of equal numbers
in ai districts. This was an attempt by New York to keep intact regions with
distinct interests and to maintain county lines. The Court held that these were not
legally acceptable justifications for departing from the standard of precise equality.
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gree of flexibility.44 The new standard appears to be a simple arithmetic
approach based solely on gross population which assumes that "equal
numbers" means "equal representation."
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has solved one serious problem,
malapportionment. However, this has been at a cost of creating or worsen-
ing a number of other problems. Complete stress on "equal numbers" in
all districts can easily lead to political and racial gerrymandering, anti-
minority districting practice, and disregard for natural boundary lines. 45
Furthermore, the Court faces the complex problem of how to apply this
strict standard to local governmental units. Application of the standard of
"equal numbers" to each unit of local government may be impossible
to enforce and in all likelihood will cause political chaos.40
Now that the Supreme Court has remedied the more flagrant abuses,
a more sophisticated approach to the problem of fair and effective rep-
resentation is required. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick
has summarily rejected the idea of a maximum allowable deviation. If
the problem were approached in this way, the Reynold's goal of "sub-
stantial equality" would be achieved and our system of effective repre-
sentation through the political process would not be unnecessarily bur-
dened by an unwarranted emphasis upon exact equality.
PATRICK E. MURPHY
44. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964), the Court stated:
It is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each
one has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters. Math-
ematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable Constitutional re-
quirement.
Also in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 the Court stated:
For the present we deem it expedient not to attempt to spell out any
precise constitutional tests. What is marginally permissible in one State
may be unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular circum-
stances of the case. Developing a body of doctrine on a case-by-case basis
appears to us to provide the most satisfactory means of arriving at de-
tailed constitutional requirements ....
45. See generally, R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPREsENTATION-REAPPORTIONMENT
IN LAW AND POLITICS (1968).
46. Id. at 544. See also, R McKAY, RFAPorTooNFI'r: THE LAw AND POL-
ITICS OF EQUAL RFPRESENTATION 215-71 (1965).
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MISSOURI ABROGATES THE "NO DUTY" RULE AS TO
SOCIAL GUESTS: RESTATEMENT (FIRST) ADOPTED
Wells v. Goforth'
Plaintiff Wells was a social guest in defendant Goforth's home. While
leaving the home, plaintiff slipped and fell on an icy portion of defend-
ant's front porch, sustaining injuries. Upon trial, plaintiff recovered
$12,500 damages. Defendant appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals,
but pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 84.05, the case was transferred
to the Missouri Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded. In revers-
ing, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized that although a finding of
"active" negligence (one of the many exceptions to the common law
rule that a landowner or occupier 2 owes "no duty" of care to those who
go on his lands as trespassers or licensees3) would have allowed recovery,
an icy porch "is not an ultrahazardous condition and a failure to warn
of the condition was not active negligence." 4
Of significance, however, is the fact that court remanded for a new trial
stating that there was a possibility that the plaintiff could establish li-
ability under the rule of section 342 of the Restatement (First) of Torts,
which would make the landowner liable for unreasonably dangerous con-
ditions known to the landowner, and which the court explicitly adopted
as the new standard by which to judge a landowner's potential liability.5
(The court specifically rejected the rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts6
which, among other things, would permit liability to be imposed without
specific knowledge on the landowner's part of the injury-producing con-
dition.) The court held that while the evidence as presented was insuf-
ficient for an affirmance under the new rule because "there [was] no
evidence from which it [could] be found, without resorting to guess
work, conjecture, or speculation, that defendants knew of the icy con-
1. 443 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
2. The terms "landowner," .occupant," ,occupier," and "possessor" should
be understood as synonymous where the issue is liability to an entrant upon the
land. Although title to the land may be helpful in determining who is or is not
a possible defendant in a suit brought by an injured licensee, the determinative
factor is control. This is explained in Note, 1 WL.A :MFr L. J. 814, 315 (1960):
Technically however, not even occupancy is the basic ingredient. The
real vital fact is control-who has primary control and authority over
the land at the time and place of injury?
2 RMSTATEMNENT (FIRST) OF ToRTs § 329 (1934), comment c, indicates that even
a disseisor can be a possessor in this sense.
3. The "no duty" rule, which meant basically that the licensee took the
premises as he found them, is fully explained later.
4. Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155, 157-58 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
5. Id. at 158. That the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the Restatement
(First) rule should come as no surprise. The older rule of the common law has
long been under attack by legal scholars (See W. PROssER, LAw oF TORTS 390 (3d
ed. 1964)), usually criticized as being contrary to public policy or as placing
"property rights" above "human rights." This dichotomy has become increasingly
popular with courts that have been influenced by the social sciences.
6. Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
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dition," 7 plaintiff would be allowed a new trial in order to test her
case under the new rule.8
The limitations on the liability of land occupants to persons enter-
ing upon their land have long constituted an exception to general negli-
gence theory. Occupants of land were once held to owe no duty of ordinary
care to entrants upon their land and were thus insulated from liability
under traditional negligence theory for injuries caused by the usage or
dangerous nature of the land.9 Later courts distinguished between in-
juries to entrants which stemmed from the condition of the premises and
those injuries which were caused by some affirmative act of the possessor 1 0
(the so-called "active-passive" negligence distinction)." In addition en-
trants were classified as trespassers, licensees, or invitees ("business vis-
itors"),'2 these classifications being a crucial factor in determining legal
rights when someone suffered injury on the lands of another.'8 This system
of classification, based upon the purpose for which the entry was made,
has extended into modem law from origins in English common law.14
The classification of trespasser signifies "[a] person who enters or re-
mains upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do
so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise."'15 Ordinarily, the pos-
sessor of land is not liable to a trespasser for injuries arising out of the
condition of his land or his active negligence.16 A licensee is "[a] person
who is privileged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the pos-
sessor's consent, whether given by invitation or permission."'17 Prior to
the Wells case, there was a general rule in Missouri, with several impor-
tant exceptions which will be discussed later, that a landowner owed "no
duty" to a licensee. Most protected by the law is the invitee (business
visitor) who is "[a] person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain
on land in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indirectly
7. Id. at 159.
8. Id. at 160.
9. McCleary, The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons
Injured While on the Land, 1 Mo. L. REv. 45 (1936).
10. Id. at 45. McCleary cited F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN Tm LAw OF TORTS 163
(1926).
11. Atterbury, Torts-Landowners Liability to a Licensee-Active-Passive
Negligence Distinction, 33 Mo. L. Rrv. 93, 94 (1968).
12. "Business visitor" is the term used in 2 REsTAmENT (Fis-r) OF TORTS §
332 (1934).
13. Wolfson v. Chelist, 284, S.W.2d 447, 448-49 (Mo. 1955). The court said:
[1n legal contemplation, the duty and the precautions to be taken in
the fulfillment of the duty arise out of the legal relationship between
the one (trespasser, licensee, or invitee) who goes upon the land and the
occupier or possessor thereof.
14. The classifications, and various duties under them, were established by
the time of Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856). In Southcote the
court stated that "[there is a distinction between persons who come on business
and those who come by invitation." However, England, by statute, has abolished
the distinction between licensees and invitees. Occupiers' Liability Act of 1957,
5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957). Both classes of entrants are now treated alike.
15. 2 REsTATEmE.wNT (FIST) OF TORTS § 329 (1934).
16. Id. § 333; RFSrATEMNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 333 (1965).
17. 2 RmSTATEMENT (FiRST) OF TORTS § 330 (1934).
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connected with business dealings between them."'I s An invitee' 9 is
normally owed a duty of ordinary care,20 although formal expression of
the obligation in such specific phrases as "make the premises safe" leaves
doubt as to whether the "duty" and the general negligence test are truly
congruent. Economic benefit to the occupier of land is the most widely
used test for conferring the status of "invitee" and is the test employed
by Missouri courts.21 Since economic benefit is determinative, it is well
settled law in Missouri and elsewhere that a social guest in a home is a
licensee and not an invitee. 22
As previously noted, the shielding of land occupants from liability
to entrants upon their land represents a common law doctrine which
was an exception to general negligence principles. Nevertheless, in some
special areas exceptions were grafted onto this common law doctrine
which in practice allowed recovery in certain types of cases. There were
at least eight of these exceptional types of cases where a failure to use
ordinary care could result in the land occupant's liability. 1) The occu-
pant was under a duty to refrain from doing "wilfull or wanton" acts
resulting in injury to all classes of entrants. 23 2) The law imposed a
duty to avoid injuring licensees and invitees by an affirmative act of neg-
ligence.24 3) The occupant had an affirmative duty to dispel or dismantle
"attractive nuisances" which lured a child upon his land and resulted in
injury.25 4) The doctrine of "hidden snares, traps, or pitfalls," which
prohibits land occupants' standing by and allowing licensees to venture
18. Id. § 332.
19. Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 1041-42, 185 S.W.2d 820, 823 (1945):
"The word 'invitation' is not used in its popular sense but in the legal sense, indi-
cating an entry for the benefit of the possessor or in the mutual interest of
the possessor and entrant."
20. 2 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) or TORTS § 343 (1934). See, e.g. Glaser v. Roths-
child, 221 Mo. 180, 186, 120 S.W. 1, 3 (En Banc 1909).
21. Gilliland v. Bondurant, 332 Mo. 881, 901, 59 S.W.2d 679, 688 (1933). The
court noted that while economic benefit is the rule, in rare cases of long, cus-
tomary entrance of potential customers, or persons coming for an educational
purpose, an invitation would be implied. See W. PROSSER, LAW oF TORTS 396 (3d
ed. 1964).
22. Wolfson v. Chelist, 284, S.W.2d 447, 448 (Mo. 1955), was quite explicit
on the status of a social guest:
It seems to be the almost universal rule in Anglo-American jurisdictions
that a social guest in a home is not an invitee in a legal sense, but is,
in law, a licensee....
Prosser writes "(A] social guest, however cordially he may have been invited
and urged to come, is not in law an invitee." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 387 (3d.
ed. 1964).
23. Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazzo & Tile Co., 246 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Mo.
1952).
24. Glaser v. Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180, 120 S.W. 1 (1909). See also Atterbury,
Torts-Landowners Liability to a Licensee-Active-Passive Negligence Distinction,
33 Mo. L. REv. 93, 94 (1968), where "active negligence" is defined as "a failure
to use reasonable care in the commission of an act resulting in harm to another."
25. This, coupled with the special leniency exhibited by courts in find-
ing contributory negligence on the part of the child trespasser or licensee, com-
prises this major exception of "attractive nuisance." Bichsel v. Blumhost, 429
S.W.2d 301, 303 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968); Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazzo &
Tile Co., 246 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Mo. 1952).
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into ultrahazardous hidden peril, was an "exception to the rule and
that a licensee takes the premises as he finds them."2 6 5) The "hard-by"
rule required the land occupant to use reasonable care to assure that
users of a public way who inadvertently strayed a few feet onto their
land were not injured. 27 6) "Discovered" trespassers, who are simply
trespassers whose presence upon the land is known by the occupant, were
also protected against active negligence2 8 on the part of the land occu-
pant. 7) Railroads had a duty to watch for trespassers where they were
known to frequent the right-of-way. 29 8) Occupants who used ultrahaz-
ardous substances on their lands, such as explosives, were required to
exercise care commensurate with the risks involved.3 0
The above exceptions indicate that in Missouri, even prior to the
adoption of Restatement (First) in the Wells case, many licensees were
allowed recovery when injured on the lands of another. The essential
prerequisite to a recovery was to categorize the case as one falling into
one or another of the exceptions. Nevertheless, occupants of land were
largely secure from the threat of potential liability arising from the normal
usage of their lands because there was no general duty of care owed to
all licensees.
The rule which the court rejected in Wells, and which has heretofore
been referred to as the "no duty" rule,3 ' was formulated in Missouri in
26. Bichsel v. Blumhost, supra note 25, at 306. The court went on to define
"ultrahazardous" as including that which is "highly dangerous to life and limb."
This is a somewhat more liberal definition than many would give. "Ultrahazard-
ous" is more often used in conjunction with cases involving explosives. See
Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Mo. En Banc 1969), where the Missouri
Supreme Court said "this Court declined to extend the hidden peril exception to
situations other than those involving harmful chemicals, explosives and other
,inherently dangerous materials."
27. Bichsel v. Blumhost, 429 S.W.2d 301 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968). See also
Patterson v. Gibson, 287 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Mo. 1956), which is cited in Bichsel.
28. McVicar v. W. R. Arthur & Co., 312 S.W.2d 805, 812 (Mo. 1958). Note
that the duty of care owed is ordinary care, and it does not include anticipation
of the possibility that the discovered adult trespasser will move from a safe area
to an unsafe one.
29. Everett v. St. Louis &c S.F. R.R., 214 Mo. 54, 112 S.W. 486 (1908); Ahne-
feld v. Wabash R.R., 212 Mo. 280, 111 S.W. 95 (1908).
30. Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Mo. En Banc 1969). The court
cites Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazzo &c Tile Co., 246 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Mo.
1952): In Boyer the court concluded that "[t]he duty to keep explosives in such
manner as not to injure others requires care commensurate with *the risk in-
volved. The status of the injured party does not necessarily control."
31. In order to better assess the rejection of the "no duty" rule in light of
the Restatement (First) rule, a hypothetical is helpful. First, consider a case under
the no duty rule: A is the occupant of Blackacre. A invites B to join a hunt
on Blackacre when the season opens. A week before the season, A noticed that a
footbridge over a deep gully had been undercut. Unfortunately, A forgets this
fact. Later, when B joined A on the hunt, B, unaware of the defect, fell through
the bridge and suffered severe injuries to his spine. Seeing the mishap, A
recalled that he had made a mental note to fix the bridge. Assuming that the
defective bridge would not be considered a "hidden trap or pitfall," under the
no duty rule A could not be held liable to B because, while A dearly knew of
the defect on his land, his only duty to B was to avoid "wilfull" or active injury
to him. B, in other words, as a social guest, could not complain since his invitation
was a gratuity and he "took the premises as he found them."
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two early cases, Kelly v. Benas and Glaser v. Rothschild, 2 both decided
in 1909. As the Glaser court enunciated:
In such cases as this the root of the thing, the deciding ques-
tion is: Do the facts raise a duty, a breach of which is shown?...
The general rule is that the owner or occupier of premises lies
under no duty to protect those from injury who go upon the pre-
mises as volunteers or merely with his express or tacit permission
from motives of curiosity or private convenience in no way con-
nected with business or other relations with the owner or occupier.
A bare licensee (barring wantonness, or some form of intentional
wrong or active negligence by the owner or occupier) takes the pre-
mises as he finds them. 33
A survey of American and English jurisdictions indicates that this rule was
in accord with the majority of courts at the time of adoption in Missouri. 34
It was the rule in Missouri until the Wells decision and was applied as
late as 1968. 3 5
The rule adopted in Wells imposes upon a land occupant a general
duty either to warn licensees of the defects on the property which are
known to him, or to make such defects safe.36 The Restatement (First)
of Torts section 342 states:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused
to gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon
if, but only if, he
(a) knows of the condition and realizes that it involves an unrea-
sonable risk to them and has reason to believe that they will
not discover the condition or realize the risk, and
Now consider the same facts except that instead of a faulty bridge, A sees
B about to toss a lighted cigar through the open door of a shed which A has
recently filled with explosives. (A shed full of explosives is obviously an ultra-
hazardous condition on the premises.) In this situation, B could recover under the
"no duty" rule because explosives must be handled in a manner commensurate
with their potential hazard, and B is entitled to a warning of such a danger.
32. Kelly v. Benas, 217 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 557 (1909); Glaser v. Rothschild, 221
Mo. 180, 120 S.W. 1 (Mo. En Banc 1909).
33. Glaser v. Rothschild, supra note 32, at 184, 120 S.W. at 2 (citations
omitted).
34. E.g., Lucas v. Walker, 22 Cal. App. 296, 301, 134 P. 374, 377 (1913); Fox
v. Warner-Quinlan Asphalt Co., 204 N.Y. 240, 243, 97 N.E. 497, 498 (1912); Watson
v. Manitou & Pikes Peak Ry., 41 Colo. 138, 142, 92 P. 17, 19 (1907). See also South-
cote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856), and McCleary, The Liability of a
Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land, 1 Mo. L. R.v.
45 (1936). In 1945 the Missouri Supreme Court noted that while the Missouri
rule was not in accord with the Restatement (First), it was in harmony "with the
majority of the jurisdictions." Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 1042, 185 S.W.2d820, 823 (1945).
35. Bichsel v. Blumhost, 429 S.W.2d 301, 303 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968).
36. Under the rule of Restatement (First), the hypothetical in note 31 supra
illustrates a changed result. Since A knew of the defective bridge and failed to
warn B, he is liable to B to the extent of his bodily injuries. Obviously, A is liable
to B under the Restatement (First) rule if he fails to warn of the shed full of ex-
plosives. The only escape from this conclusion lies in the remote possibility that A
could reasonably have expected B to discover the risks for himself, or the equally
remote possibility that A might not have realized the danger to B where the bridge
was the injury producing instrumentality.
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(b) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land,
without exercising reasonable care
(i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or
(ii) to warn them of the condition and the risk involved there-
in.3a
Under this rule the crucial factor to be determined is the occupant's
knowledge of the defect. 38 The Wells opinion states, "We do not believe
a possessor of land should be subject to liability for bodily harm . . .
unless the possessor is himself aware of the condition."3 9 However, the
court held that "a possessor's 'knowledge' may be proved by circumstantial
evidence," 40 but the finding of a possessor's knowledge from circum-
stantial evidence must not be the "result of guesswork, conjecture or
speculation .... "41 Thus, liability, to a great extent, is predicated upon
a subjective element in the proof-the actual scienter of the defendant
to be charged.
The possessor, in addition to knowing of a defect, must realize that
it constitutes an unreasonable danger to his licensee in order for him to
be subject to liability.42 But some defects could conceivably be dangerous
only at certain times of the day or night, or only under certain conditions.
Thus, if a licensee exceeds the bounds of his license by coming upon the
premises at a different time of day than that contemplated by the pos-
sessor, or at a different location, proceeds with some activity other than
that expected by the possessor, or in any other way abuses his licensor's
gratuity, the possessor cannot be deemed to have realized that a partic-
ular condition on the premises constituted a hazard to the licensee when
it otherwise would not have. The possessor would not be liable to the
licensee under such circumstances.43
A possessor of land has two options under Restatement (First). He can
either make the known hazardous condition safe for licensees, or warn
licensees of the potential hazard.4 4 Whichever alternative the possessor
chooses, he must proceed with reasonable care.4 5 However, under no cir-
cumstances need the possessor inspect his premises in order to discover,
cure or be able to warn of all possible defects.48 Nor are licensees en-
37. 2 RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 342 (1934). Comment b of § 340 in-
dicates that the term "risk" means "not only the existence of a risk but also its
extent." Id. § 340, comment b.
38. 2 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 342 (1934).
39. Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. The court cites Herrman v. Daffin, 302 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1957).
42. 2 RESTATEAmNT (FrST) or TORTS.§ 342, comment f (1934).
43. Id.
44. 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 63 ( 1966).
45. Id.
46. 2 RFsTATEMENT (FsT) OF TORTS § 342, comment c (1934). It should be
noted, however, that the Wells court neither adopted nor rejected any of the
comments or examples following this section. While the body of § 342 is now law
in Missouri, the materials in the Restatement (First) explaining it are not neces-
sarily the law also.
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titled to special physical preparation of the premises for their safe visit.47
The possessor is entitled to expect that his licensees will use their own
faculties to discover potential dangers to their persons.48 Since the liabil-
ity of the possessor under this rule is predicated not upon a duty to keep
his premises in a safe condition, but rather upon a duty to give a warn-
ing of dangerous conditions,49 a permanent notice in the form of a sign
could be considered sufficient to fulfill a possessor's duty to warn. In fact,
the comments in the Restatement (First) specifically suggest that a sign
be used.50
Since the duty owed to a licensee is to warn him of danger, the
assumption necessarily follows that if by any means whatsoever the li-
censee becomes aware of the conditions which might imperil him, the
possessor is not liable for subsequent injuries. 51 Therefore, even though
adopting a new rule which enlarges liability, the court has left untouched
the stricter contributory fault rule traditionally applicable to cases in-
volving the liability of landowners. Under this rule the plaintiff is barred
from recovering if, at the time the injury was sustained, he knew52 of
the injury producing condition, regardless of whether exposing himself
to it was reasonable under the circumstances. Moreover, and despite what
would appear to be the less disabling criteria of Restatement (First),
which the Missouri Supreme Court has approved,53 it is dear that under
Missouri Approved Instruction section 22.03 a plaintiff is barred even
if he was unaware of the "condition" if in the exercise of reasonable
care he could have known of it.54
Although section 22.03 applies only to "invitees," since invitees are
owed more care than "licensees," it is difficult to believe that the Supreme
Court Committee intended to make it easier for licensees to recover than
for invitees. Such a rule is more limiting than the normal contributory
negligence rule because, under the latter rule, the plaintiff is not barred,
even if he knew of the injury producing condition, if the jury neverthe-
less believes that he used "that degree of care (for his own safety) that
an ordinarily careful and prudent person would use under the same or
similar circumstances."5 5 Similarly, by requiring the plaintiff, as a con-
dition to recovery, to show that he was not aware, and that by the exer-
47. 2 RE TATEMENT (FiRST) Or ToTS § 342 comment e (1934).
48. Id.
49. 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 63 (1966).
50. 2 RESTATEmNT (FiRsT) Or TORTS § 342, comment h (1984). The only re-juirements are that the sign present an "adequate disclosure of the condition" if
athe risk is not disclosed by a mere notice of the condition." The sign probably
would not fulfill the duty if the licensee was a child.
51. 2 RSTATErNT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 342, comment b (1934), makes this
proposition clear. See also, W. PROSSER, LAw or TORTS 391 (3d ed. 1964), and 2
RESTATEMENT (FIRSr) or TORTS § 340 (1934).
52. 2 RESTATE mT (FimsT) or TORTS § 340 (1934). Note comment e.
53. RLESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS, MissouRI ANNOTATIONS § 340 (1936).
54. Mo. Approved Instr. § 22.03 (1969).
55. Mo. Approved Instr. § 11.02 (1969). For example, in Missouri, under Mo.
Approved Instr. § 82.01 (1969), a plaintiff is not barred from recovery if he failed
to keep a careful lookout so long as his failure was not negligent as defined in Mo.
Approved Instr. § 11.02 (1969).
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cise of reasonable care could not have been aware, of the injury producing
condition, the burden of pleading and proving freedom from contributory
negligence is placed upon the plaintiff, whereas this issue is normally an
affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the defendant.56
The rejection, by the Missouri Supreme Court, of the more liberal
test of the Restatement (Second) is more understandable when one com-
pares that Restatements distinction between the duty owed by a land-
owner towards an invitee, and that owed to a licensee. It is submitted
that under the Restatement (Second) the only difference between those
obligations is that the defendant is liable to the licensee if he "knows
or has reason to know of the condition . . . ." whereas he is liable to
the invitee if he "knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would dis-
cover the condition ... ," a distinction so technical as, arguably, to dis-
pose of any substantial difference between the two classifications.5 7 If
the Restatement (Second) has taken a long step in reducing the immunity
of a landowner with respect to injuries sustained on his property by li-
censees, California has gone all the way. In Rowland v. Christian58 the
California Supreme Court abolished the special immunities enjoyed by
landowners and ruled that the special relationship, if any, between the
landowner and the status of the entrant-plaintiff were aspects of the
"same or similar circumstances" test of general negligence theory which
would hold a defendant liable only if he failed to use that degree of
care which the ordinarily careful and prudent person would use under
such "same or similar circumstances."
The courts of Missouri have not gone nearly so far as either the
Restatement (Second) of Torts or Rowland v. Christian. Therefore, the
net effect of the Wells case, it would seem, is to give greater "protection"
to social guests, while retaining a modicum of immunity to the landowner.
The duty to warn of known defects on the premises is now comprehensive
as to all licensees-the most numerous class of entrants.
WILLIAM H. PENNINGTON
56. § 509.090, RSMo (1959); W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 426 (3d ed. 1964).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 342, 343 (1965).
58. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
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MUST SERVICE OF PROCESS BE PERSONAL IN ORDER
TO OBTAIN IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION?
State ex rel. Dorn v. Morley1
Oscar Stein filed suit against Janet Dorn for rent past due and re-
possession of certain premises. The constable specified that relator was
"not found" in the City of St. Louis. In accordance with section 535.030(2),
RSMo 1959, the special service of summons provision in "Landlord-Tenant
Actions," an order of "Publication of Notice" was posted in four public
places for ten days.2 That statute provides that if personal service cannot be
given because defendant is "not found," service may be made by posting
notice in four public places.3 On the return date judgment by default
was entered against relator for both the past due rent and restitution of
the premises. Restitution was made but Dorn challenged the personal
judgment as to rent past due because there had been no personal service
of summons upon her.4 She also challenged the constitutionality of section
535.030(2) as not providing a method of notice reasonably calculated to
inform a defendant of the pendency of a suit.
Judge Holman, speaking for a unanimous court, reversed the per-
1. 442 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
2. Id. at 930.
3. § 535.030 (2), RSMo 1959. The pertinent portion of the statute is as
follows:
If the officer shall return that the defendant is not found, or that he has
absconded or absented himself from his usual place of abode in this
state, it shall be the duty of the magistrate before whom the proceeding
is commenced to make an order directing that notices shall be set up for
ten days in four public places in his county, informing the defendant of
the commencement of proceedings against him. And on proof of the
notice by affidavit of some competent witness, the magistrate shall pro-
ceed to hear the case as if there had been personal service, and judgment
shall be rendered and proceedings had as in other cases.
4. In a similar case handed down the same day, State ex rel. Williams v.
Weisman, 442 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. En Banc 1969), the court invalidated an in per-
sonam judgment gained through notice by public posting in accordance with§ 534.090 (2), (3), RSMo 1959. The pertinent portion of the statute is as follows:
2. If the plaintiff allege in his complaint, under oath or by separate
affidavit, that the defendant has absconded or absented himself from his
usual place of abode in this state, or if the officer shall return that the
defendant is not found, or has absconded or has absented himself from his
usual place of abode in this state, and if the plaintiff has stated in his
complaint, under oath or by separate affidavit, the last known address of the
defendant, the magistrate shall make an order for service by mail and thejudge or clerk shall serve a copy of the summons and a copy of the petition
by registered mail at least ten days before the return date thereof, re-
questing a return receipt signed by the addressee only, addressed to the
defendant at the address furnished by the plaintiff.
3. If the last knon address of the defendant is not given, it shall be the
duty of the magistrate before whom the proceedings is commenced to
make an order directing that notices shall be set up for ten days in four
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sonal judgments for rent past due stating, "It has always been the law of
this state that a personal judgment cannot be rendered . unless there
had been personal service of summons upon [the defendant] .... r Turn-
ing to section 535.030(2), the statute allowing constructive service of process
in "Landlord-Tenant Actions," the court held that "to the extent that
it may be construed to authorize a personal judgment such as the one entered
against relator [without personal service], it is unconstitutional and void."6
Since the restitution of premises had already been made (thereby
rendering the in rein issue moot), the court did not rule on the general
attack made by relator that section 535.030(2) was unconstitutional in
that it does not provide a method of notice reasonably calculated to inform
a defendant of the pendency of a suit as required by due process. However,
strong dicta by the court indicated the statute, even when applied to in
rem proceedings, would be unconstitutional and advised magistrates to
use some form of service more reasonably calculated to provide actual no-
tice until the General Assembly has corrected the statute by proper
amendment.7
There can be no doubt that the holding in Dorn is required by both
the Missouri decisionsS and the statutes; 9 that is, personal judgments re-
quire personal service. However, the court, in holding that this result "is
required by the due process clauses of both the State and Federal Constitu-
tions,"'1 is overstating the federal requirements. Although Missouri courts
may have interpreted the due process clause in the Missouri Constitution
as requiring personal service, the federal courts and courts of several other
states have not been so strict. Thus, while the United States Supreme
Court suggested in the case of Pennoyer v. Neff," that a personal judgment
5. State ex rel. Domn v. Morely, 442 S.W.2d 929, 930 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 931.
8. In the early case of Hamill v. Talbott, 81 Mo. App. 210 (K.C. Ct. App.
1899), the Kansas City Court of Appeals took the liberal view that "a judgment
may in such a case [when a state citizen is absent from the state] be rendered
against and charge a defendant in personam without any personal service .... "
However, in Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, 111 S.W. 475 (1908), the Supreme Court
of Missouri took a much more conservative position and decided that personal
service was required for personal judgments. Since that time Missouri courts have
followed the precedent laid down by Moss. See Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo.
1029, 218 S.W. 2d 566 (En Banc 1949); State ex rel. McIndoe v. Blair, 238 Mo.
132, 153, 142 S.W. 326, 331 (En Banc 1911); State ex rel. Jones v. Miller, 349 S.W.2d
534, 537 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Elvins v. Elvins, 176 Mo. App. 645, 651, 159 S.W.
746, 748 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913).
9. Legislative intent with respect to service of process by publication is
dearly that such service shall be valid only for certain in rem judgments. Section
506.160 (1), RSMo 1959 provides:
Service by mail or publication shall be allowed in all cases affecting a
fund, will, trust estate, specific property, or any interest therein, or any
res or statute within the jurisdiction of the court, or in any special proceed-
ings in which notice by mail or by publication is authorized.., but such
service shall not warrant a general judgment against such defendant. (Em-
phasis added)
10. State ex rel. Dora v. Morely, 442 S.W.2d 929, 930 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
11. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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by constructive service of process upon a nonresident is contrary to due
process of law (a holding that has been greatly limited by later cases),12
this decision was never applied to personal judgments against residents of
the state where it is impracticable or impossible to get actual personal
service.13
The federal courts, in fact, appear to make no distinction at all be-
tween service for in personam and in rem proceedings in the determination
of adequacy of notice.14 Professor Leflar makes the statement that "[t]he
Constitutional requirements for both are the same .... 15 Various state
courts have also held that personal service is not always a prerequisite to
personal judgment when the defendant is a resident.' 6 Confusion apparently
arises from the failure to distinguish between personal jurisdiction and
adequacy of notice. In Missouri these two areas of law have been blurred
to the extent that personal jurisdiction is held to depend upon adequacy
of notice. Federal courts and legal writers indicate that these are two
separate questions.17
The failure to draw a distinction between personal jurisdiction and
adequacy of notice has led Missouri courts to misinterpret federal author-
ity as requiring personal service in order to obtain in personam judgments.
12. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This
case departs from the strict holding in Pennoyer v. Neff, by requiring a test of
"minimum contacts" and "fairness" to obtain jurisdiction. See Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
13. Jacobs v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912). In this case the Court held that
due process was afforded defendants by substituted process by newspaper publica-
tion after diligent inquiry to find defendants has been made. See also Santiago v.
Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 (1909); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1902); Nations
v. Johnson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 69 (1860); Ouseley v. Lehigh Valley Trust & Safe-
Deposit Co., 84 F. 602 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1897).
14. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Sc Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950).
In speaking of the distinction between in rem or in personam in so far as some
courts require different service of process according to classifications, the Court
said, "But in any event we think the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive and
confused generally .... "
15. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 20 (2d ed. 1968). See also Hazard,
A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, THE SUPREME COURT REvIEw 241,
277 (P. Kurland ed. 1965); R. CRAMNiToN &c D. CUmPME, CONFLICT oF LAws 557(1968).
16. Griffen v. County of Cook, 369 Ill. 380, 389, 16 N.E.2d 906, 911 (1938).
rhe court stated:
A] judgment in personam may be obtained against a resident of the State
by constructive service, if it appears actual service of process cannot be
had upon him, and notice is given in such manner the reasonable prob-
abilities are the defendant will receive notice of the pending action or
proceeding before a judgment or decree is rendered against him.
Accord, Ward Lumber Co. v. Henderson-White Mfg. Co., 107 Va. 626, 59 S.E. 476(1907); Clearwater Mercantile Co. v. Roberts, Johnson, Rand Shoe Co., 51 Fla.
176, 40 So. 436 (1906); Connecticut-Trust Sc Safety Dep. Co. v. Wead, 172 N.Y.
497, 65 N.E. 261 (1902); Fernandez v. Casey Sc Swasey, 77 Tex. 452, 14 S.W. 149(1890); Ware v. Robinson, 9 Cal. 108 (1958).
17. See R. CRAMiPTON & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAwS 557 (1968) where, in
reference to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., these authors state
that the "decision dearly distinguishes between personal jurisdiction, which is a
conflicts question, and notice, which is not."
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Nevertheless, under present Missouri doctrine, one who purposely absents
himself from his place of abode, hides out, or uses subterfuge to mislead
the server, cannot be personally bound by judgment in that suit. There
are many situations that work a hardship on the party seeking redress
because personal service is not possible or practical.18 In view of the federal
doctrine and many state doctrines permitting substituted or constructive
process, and in view of the increased reliability of modern communications,
a review and perhaps revision of the Missouri rule would be most appropri-
ate.19
The second facet of Dorn that has significance for practicing attorneys
and magistrate judges in Missouri is the dicta indicating that the statute,
even as applied to in rem proceedings, might be found to be unconstitu-
tional because it does not "provide a method of giving notice which is
reasonably calculated to inform a defendant of the pendency of the
suit ... ."20 Unlike the holding in Dorn, this dicta has ample precedent
in several United States Supreme Court cases. The case of Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Company, while restating the federal rule
that publication may be justifiable "where it is not reasonably possible
or practicable to give more adequate warning,"21 held that "[w]here the
names and post-office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at
hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails
to appraise them of its pendency."'2 2 The Mullane principle, has been re-
affirmed in a case with a factual situation closely analogous to that of
Dorn.2 3 The Supreme Court has also taken the position that "[t]o dis-
pense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to reach the
defendant is the least that ought to be required .... "24 In the Dorn case,
registered mail would have been more likely to provide actual notice
than those methods authorized by statute. Thus, the Missouri court seems
correct in deciding that section 535.030(2), RSMo 1959 would be uncon-
stitutional even when applied only to in rem proceedings.2 5
18. In Mitchell v. Hines, 305 Mich. 296, 9 N.W.2d 547 (1948), defendant
outran the process server and locked himself in a house. Service was invalid when
the server threw the summons into the kitchen because it was not personally served.
19. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri has
recently stated in Adams Dairy Co. v. National Dairy Products Corp., 293 F. Supp.
1135, 1144 (W.D. 1968) that:
The Supreme Court of Missouri applies the same standards applied by
the Supreme Court of the United States to due process questions pre-
sented under the due process clauses contained in both the Missouri and
federal constitutions.
There is, however, no authority in the Missouri State courts on the point, See,
however, Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952),
rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1953), where the Court said that federal due
process does not compel a state to open its courts to the full extent permitted by
due process.
20. 442 S.W.2d at 930.
21. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
22. Id. at 318.
23. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
24. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
25. It should be noted that the dicta of the Dorn case was not expressly
extended to State ex rel. Williams v. Weisman, 442 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. En Banc 1969)
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To remedy this probable statutory infirmity, the court recommended
that magistrates "order some form of service more reasonably calculated to
provide actual notice, in addition to that required by section 535.030(2)."26
Missouri attorneys and magistrates might assume that that dicta indicates
approval of the use of other than personal service to obtain in rem juris-
diction within the scope of the statute as long as it is reasonably calculated
to provide notice. Such reliance may not be well founded.
It is generally accepted that if "constructive service is in certain situ-
ations substituted in the place of personal service . . . a strict and literal
compliance with the provisions of the law must be shown in order to
support the judgment .... "27 Missouri courts have consistently maintained
the requirement of strict compliance with service of process statutes that
are in derogation of the common law.28 Furthermore, Missouri courts have
stated that "[a]ctual notice, given in any manner other than that prescribed
by statute, cannot 'supply constitutional validity to the statute or to service
under it.' "20 Finally, in a situation directly related to the dicta addressed
to magistrates in the Dorn case, the Missouri Supreme Court followed the
federal case of Wuchter v. Pizzuttie30 in holding that:
[E]ven actual notice, gratuitously furnished under a statute which
does not contain adequate requirements for notice, is insufficient
. .. for such a statute does not meet the requirements of due
process.31
In light of these decisions, magistrates would be ill-advised to rely on
any form of constructive service designed to provide notice of in rem
proceedings under section 535.030 even if the form of service is reasonably
calculated to provide actual notice.
JoHN R. PHm Ps
(discussed note 4 supra). The statute in the Williams case, § 534.090, RSMo 1959,
does provide for service by registered mail to be attempted before an order of pub-
lication can be issued "if the plaintiff has stated in his complaint . . . the last
known address of defendant .... 1
26. State ex rel. Dorn v. Morely, 442 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
27. 42 Am . JUR. PROCESS § 66 (1942).
28. See Kelly v. Murdagh, 184 Mo. 377, 378, 83 S.W. 437, 488 (1904), where
the court held that service by publication in an in rem proceeding was invalid
because a newspaper published a corrected version of an incorrect court order. The
reasoning of the court was that the newspaper could not correct the errors of the
court; therefore, the service was not made in conformity to the statutes even
though the correct version did appear in the newspaper; Davison v. Arne, 348 Mo.
790, 155 S.W.2d 155 (1941); Johns v. Hargrove & Ruth Lumber Co., 219 S.W. 967
(Mo. 1920); Harness v. Cravens, 126 Mo. 233, 28 S.W. 971 (1894); But see State
ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. Sale, 232 Mo. 166, 182 S.W. 1119 (1910).
29. Harris v. Bates, 364 Mo. 1023, 1031, 270 S.W.2d 763, 769 (1954) (emphasis
added).
30. 276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928). In that case the defendant received substituted
service out of state in addition to the service authorized by statute that the court
decided was invalid. The court stated that the process which was over and above
the statute did not serve notice because such notice "[n]ot having been directed
by the statute . . . cannot, therefore, supply constitutional validity to the statute
or to the service under it."








SECTION 16(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corporation'
George M. Bunker, President and Chief Executive of Martin Marietta
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Martin), served on the Board
of Directors of Sperry Rand Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Sperry)
from April 29 to August 1, 1963. During this period Martin purchased
101,300 shares of Sperry stock, augmenting its previous holding of 700,000
shares. In the period between August 29 and September 6, 1963, Martin
sold its entire portfolio of Sperry stock at a profit.
Plaintiff, a Sperry stockholder, after making proper demand,2 which
was not complied with, filed this action under the provisions of section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 to recover, on behalf of
Sperry, the profit made by Martin on the 101,300 shares bought during
Bunker's directorship. Plaintiff alleged that Martin "deputized" Bunker
to represent its interests on the Sperry Board thus making Martin a
"director" within the purview of section 16(b). The trial court felt that
there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of deputization and
gave judgment for defendant.4 The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the factual findings of the lower court were
1. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
2. Section 16 (b) provides that suit may be instituted at law by the owner of
any security of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
sixty days after request. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1964). However, the sixty day waiting
period may be waived where the issuing corporation is controlled by the offending
insider. Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1964). This section provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any pur-
chase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than
six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by
the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period
exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or
by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the
issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days
after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but
no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such
profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time
of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved,
or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and reg-
ulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
subsection.
4. Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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"clearly erroneous,"8 and making an affirmative fact finding of deputiza-
tion.6
Section 16(b) was designed to prevent possible unfair use of inside
information by making officers, directors, and beneficial owners of ten
percent of any class of registered equity security7 liable to the issuer for
any profit made by such person on a short-swing8 purchase9 and sale1° of
such security." Any shareholder of the issuing corporation may institute
proceedings on behalf of the corporation under section 16(b) even though
he may not have been a shareholder at the time of the short-swing trans-
action.' 2 The suit may be brought in the federal district court in any
district where the defendant is found, where he transacts business, where
any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred,' 3 or where an
exchange, if used, is located.' 4 Venue requirements are satisfied for the
entire claim if any one of the transactions involved occurred within the
forum district' 5 and nationwide service of process is allowed.'6 All
profits' 7 are recoverable, and a settlement with the issuing corporation is
no defense to a section 16(b) action brought by a stockholder.' s
5. Fm. R. Civ. P. 52 (a).
6. Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
896 U.S. 1036 (1970).
7. Section 16 (a) specifies any class of equity security registered pursuant to
§ 12 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964). This includes both those securities listed
on an exchange and the equity securities of an issuer with over $1 million in gross
assets and 500 or more shareholders registered under § 12 (g).
8. The time of "short swing" is 6 months minus one full period from mid-
night to midnight since the law doesn't take into account fractions of a day. Stella
v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 859 U.S.
914 (1959).
9. The Act defines purchase as "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise
acquire." 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (13) (1964). For a summary of the type of transactions
held to be a purchase see Comment, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Sec-
tion 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 59 YALE L.J. 510 (1950).
10. Sale is defined as "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c (a) (14) (1964). See Comment, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Sec-
tion 16(b) of the Exchange Act, supra note 9.
11. "Purchase and sale" has been interpreted to mean any combination of
purchase and sale or sale and purchase which, on matching of an equal number of
shares of the same security, shows a purchase price lower than the sale price.
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 820 U.S. 751 (1948).
12. Section 16 (b) actions need not conform with the requirements of deriva-
tive actions by shareholders set out in FFm. L Civ. P. 28. This is because the pur-
pose of the statute, discouragement of insider trading, is remedial. Benisch v.
Cameron, 81 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). A § 16 (b) action is, however, a true
class action subject to FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c). Pottish v. Divak, 71 F. Supp. 737
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
14. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
15. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954).
16. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (1964).
17. Profit from a purchase and sale, or a sale and purchase, is measured by
matching up the lowest purchase price transaction with the highest sale price
transaction within a six month period. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231,
239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 820 U.S. 751 (1943). See also 2 L. Loss, SEcuptrrmS RE,-
urArioN 1063 (2d ed. 1961).
18. Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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Because the statute is broadly remedial and recovery runs to the issuing
corporation,
we must suppose that the statute was intended to be thoroughgo-
ing, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions and
thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict be-
tween the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or stock-
holder and the faithful performance of his duty.19
This high standard, coupled with the relative ease with which suits may
be brought, has caused section 16(b) to be called the most "cordially dis-
liked provision in all these statutes from the point of view of those whom
it affects." 20 Because Feder expands its scope of applicability, section 16(b)
may become even more cordially disliked.
Judge Learned Hand, concurring in Rattner v. Lehman,21 first hinted
that a deputization theory, such as that advanced in Feder, might be
recognized. In Rattner, a partner of Lehman Brothers sat on the board
of Vultee Aircraft Corporation. During his directorship, the Lehman part-
nership bought and sold Vultee stock within a six month period at a
profit of $15,000. In a shareholder's suit to recover this profit from the
partnership, summary judgment for Lehman Brothers was granted.22 The
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals2 3 with Hand saying:
I wish to say nothing as to whether, if a firm deputed a partner
to represent its interests as a director on the board, the other part-
ners would not be liable. True, they would not even then be for-
mally 'directors'; but I am not prepared to say that they could
not be so considered.24
Section 3(a)(7) of the Act defines "directors" as "any director of a
corporation or any person performing similar functions" 25 and section
3(a)(9) defines "person"' as "an individual, a corporation, a partnership
..... 28 The proposition that a corporation may be treated as a jural
person is well established 27 and corporations have been held liable under
section 16(b) as beneficial ten percent shareholders. 28 However, until Feder,
no court had ever based a decision on a deputization theory, although it
has been recognized several times in dicta.29
19. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943).
20. 2 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 1087.
21. 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
22. Rattner v. Lehman, 98 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
23. Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
24. Id. at 567.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (7) (1964) (emphasis added).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (9) (1964) (emphasis added).
27. United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50 (1909); United States v.
Amedy, 24 U.S. 392 (1826); 2 E. COKE, INS~uTTEs 736 (6th ed. 1681).
28. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002(1967); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954).
29. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564(2d Cir. 1952); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Molybdenum Corp. of America v. Int'l Mining Corp., 32 F.R.D. 415(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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In Blau v. Lehman,30 which involved the same type of factual situ-
ation as Rattner, one Thomas, a Lehman Brothers partner, was a director
of Tide Water Associated Oil Co. While Thomas held this post, and
within a six month period, Lehman Brothers bought and sold Tide Water
stock, realizing a profit. Blau, seeking to force the partnership to disgorge
its profits, sued under section 16(b), claiming that Lehman Brothers had
deputized Thomas to represent its interests on the Tide Water Board.
The trial court found no evidence to support this allegation.3 1 Although
the Supreme Court refused to overturn this finding as it was not "dearly
erroneous,"3 2 Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated that:
No doubt Lehman Brothers, though a partnership, could for pur-
poses of § 16 be a 'director' of Tide Water and function through a
deputy... Consequently, Lehman Brothers would be a 'director'
of Tide Water, if as petitioner's complaint charged Lehman ac-
tually functioned as a director through Thomas, who had been
deputized ... to perform a director's duties, not for himself but
for Lehman.3 3
The Southern District of New York through dictum also recognized
the validity of the deputization theory in Marquette Cement Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Andreas,3 4 where Andreas, the sole trustee of nineteen trusts
which held all the shares of the Andreas Corporation, sat on Marquette's
Board while the Andreas Corporation sold Marquette stock for a short-
swing profit. In regard to plaintiff's contention that the Andreas Corpora-
tion was a director because trustee Andreas was its deputy, the court said
"[t]hat such a deputization is possible seems dear after Blan v. Lehman,
but its existence is a question of fact to be settled case by case." 36
The Feder court noted four evidentiary factors which led to the
finding of the existence of deputization. First was the "unique position"
of Bunker as chief executive officer of Martin. He had personal approval
of all investments, particularly Martin's purchases and sales of Sperry
stock. This position eliminated the necessity of showing a disclosure
of information or consultation with others by the alleged deputy.36 Al-
though actual use of inside information by a deputizing corporation need
not be proven, 7 it seems clear that if the deputy were a person of lower
30. 568 U.S. 403 (1962).
31. Blau v. Lehman, 173 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
32. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
33. Id. at 409-10.
34. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
35. Id. at 967.
36. Control by the deputy of the appointing corporation is a factual element
in determining deputization. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp.
962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
It should be recognized that the court in the noted case also found that there
had in fact been discussions between Bunker and other Martin officials of Sperrys'
affairs, and Bunker had participated in sessions in which Martin's investment in
Sperry was reviewed. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 460 F.2d 260, 264 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
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executive rank a disclosure of relevant information concerning the issuing
corporation would have to be shown.38
Second, the court found a "specific intent" that Bunker act as
Martin's representative in the Martin Board's formal consent to Bunker's
taking the Sperry directorship. Although this consent was standard pro-
cedure for any Martin officer planning to assume a directorship, it became
especially significant because the board learned of the large block of
Sperry stock held by Martin before passing the authorization. The value of
this evidence was enhanced by Bunker's testimony that he thought the
Martin Board would "draw the inference" that his presence on Sperry's
Board would be to Martin's advantage. 39
Third, the court found in Bunker's letter of resignation evidence that
Sperry itself felt Bunker was serving on the board in Martin's behalf.
In the letter, Bunker noted that when he became a director, Sperry per-
sonnel felt that the Martin ownership of a substantial number of Sperry
shares should have representation on the board, and that since such repre-
sentation was no longer necessary, he was resigning.4°
Finally, Bunker's admission that Martin had representatives serving
on other boards showed that the concept of deputization was not foreign
to Martin. While Bunker tried to distinguish between his position and
that of the other representatives, plaintiff contended that those differ-
ences (e.g., corporate supervision of directorship activities) were explained
by Bunker's "position of ultimate authority," that the other deputies re-
ported to Bunker, and that it was senseless to expect Bunker to report
formally to himself.41 The trial court rejected this contention, finding no
proof that Bunker had appointed himself.42 However, the appellate court
agreed with plaintiff, feeling that the evidence justified a finding of depu-
tization. 43
Clearly Feder will have a significant effect on business practices. Cor-
porate investment officers and their authorizing superiors now have notice
that their service as directors of other corporations may subject their firms
to liability. Although they had fair warning in Blau of possible liability
through the deputization theory, the quantum of evidence necessary to
support such a finding was undetermined. Feder clears up some of the
uncertainty, but major questions are left unanswered.
The court held that all four evidentiary factors cited were con-
clusive of deputization. However, the last two factors, Sperry's under-
standing that Bunker was representing Martin's interests44 and the exist-
38. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 406 (1962).
39. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937, 944-45 (SD.N.Y. 1968).
The trial court felt that this wasn't convincing.
40. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
41. Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
42. Id. at 948.
43. Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 266 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
44. Even if the issuing corporation consents to the presence of a deputy on
its board of directors, such consent would not be a defense for the deputizing cor-
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ence of Martin's other deputies are actually only cumulative evidence of
Martin's intent to deputize. Intent and disclosure of inside information
or participation in investment decisions are the two essential elements
of a plaintiff's case. The court's refusal to say that these two factors are
enough for a prima facie case may indicate that a substantial degree of
proof will be required.
The issue in a deputization suit should be the point at which the
deputizing corporation becomes a "director." Once this is resolved, liability
follows automatically, for the use or even existence of inside information
is not relevant to a Section 16(b) action.45 Thus, both the discussion in the
Blau opinion concerning the failure to disclose confidential information
and the existence of Bunker's "unique position" in Feder represent irrele-
vant factors unless the courts mean that deputization can be found only
when the deputy actually functions as a deputy and his firm receives
substantial benefit from his presence on another board.
Left unanswered by Feder is whether intent and benefit are both
necessary to sustain an allegation of deputization. If the deputy is actually
channeling information back to his own company, arguably it should make
no difference what reason he may have had for initially assuming the
position.46 Conversely, if a corporation sends one of its officers to the
board of another corporation with the intention of receiving a benefit
thereby, is it significant whether it actually received such benefit? In light
of the objective nature of the Section 16(b) action, it would seem not.
It is apparent that deputization is far from a settled doctrine. The
court's prior liberal interpretation of Section 16(b) 47 hints at a broad ap-
plication of the concept. Conceivably, either of the situations mentioned
above could lead to liability. Feder should serve, if Blau failed to do so,
as a caveat for all corporations and partnerships who deal in the securities
of corporations in which they may be classified as directors.
MICHAEL J. THmMPsoN
poration in a § 16 (b) suit because the purpose of the statute is the protection of
minority stockholders. Magida v. Continental Can Co., Inc., 231 F.2d 843, 846
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956).
45. "A subjective standard of proof, requiring a showing of an actual unfair
use of inside information, would render senseless the provisions of the legislation
limiting the liability period to 6 months." Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
46. For a pre-Feder discussion of this approach, see W. PAvIER, FEDERAL REG-
ULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 89 (1968).
47. Silverman v. Re, 194 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Benisch v. Cameron,
81 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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DIRECT DIPEACHMENT OF AN ADVERSE PARTY
Wells v. Goforth'
As plaintiff, a social guest, was departing defendant's home she stepped
on an ice-covered portion of the front porch, slipped and fell. Having
sustained injuries from the fall, she brought an action for damages in the
Circuit Court of St. Louis County. At trial, plaintiff called defendant to
testify as an adverse party-witness,2 and, being dissatisfied with his testi-
mony, plaintiff attempted to impeach defendant by introducing evidence
of an inconsistent written statement made by him prior to trial. Following
the rule that a party may not impeach his own witness, even if such wit-
ness is an adverse party,3 the court rejected plaintiff's evidence. The court
did, however, award judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $12,500.
Defendant appealed and the case was transferred to the Missouri Supreme
Court.
4
The supreme court reversed and remanded the case to the trail court
on the issue of liability only, holding that while plaintiff had failed to
establish defendant's liability, the trial court had committed reversible error
in rejecting plaintiff's evidence. 5 Although the decision represents a signifi-
cant change in land-owner liability in Missouri, only the issue of plaintiff's
evidence will be considered here.
1. 443 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
2. § 491.030, RSMo 1959:
Any party to any civil action or proceeding may compel any adverse
party, or any person for whose immediate and adverse benefit such action
is instituted, prosecuted or defended, to testify as a witness in his behalf,
in the same manner and subject to the same rules as other witnesses; pro-
vided, that the party so called may be examined by the opposite party,
under the rules applicable to the cross examination of witnesses.
For a discussion of the relationship between statutes allowing a party to call
his opponent as a witness and the rule against direct impeachment of one's own
witness see 3 J. WGMoRE, EvmiNc § 916 at 436 (3d ed. 1940). Prior to Wells, the
Missouri statute was not interpreted as allowing direct impeachment of the adverse
party. Frank v. Wabash R.R., 295 S.W.2d 16, 23 (Mo. 1956).
3. While there are exceptions to this general rule, it has been used re-
peatedly in Missouri decisions. E.g., Frank v. Wabash R.R., 295 S.W.2d 16 (Mo.
1956); Smith v. Ohio Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 320 Mo. 146, 6 S.W.2d 920 (En
Banc 1928); Black v. Epstein, 221 Mo. 286, 120 S.W. 754 (1909); Imhoff v. Mc-
Arthur, 146 Mo. 371, 48 S.W. 456 (1898); Chandler v. Fleeman, 50 Mo. 239 (1872);
Hutchinson v. Stienke, 353 S.W.2d 137 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Gallatin ex rel.
Dixon v. Murphy, 217 S.W.2d 400 (K.C. Mo. App. 1948); Luzzader v. McCall,
198 S.W. 1144 (K.C. Mo. App. 1917).
4. Upon defendant's application the case was transferred to the Missouri
Supreme Court pursuant to Mo. R. Civ. P. 84.05 (I).
5. The court held that plaintiff had failed to establish defendant's knowl-
edge of the ice. In so holding, the court noted that had the trial court permitted
the attempted impeachment, plaintiff may have established such knowledge. It
follows, then, that the prior written statement contained an admission of defend-
ant's knowledge, yet plaintiff made no attempt to introduce defendant's statement
as an admission. As Judge Storckman points out in his concurring opinion in
Wells, had plaintiff so introduced the statement the whole problem of direct
impeachment would have been avoided. Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155, 160
(Mo. En Banc 1969).
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Prior to Wells, it had been well settled in Missouri that a party would
not be permitted to impeach his own witness. 6 This rule first arose in
primitive trial proceedings where the sole function of the witness was to
swear to the veracity of the proponent.7 In such a proceeding, the party could
choose anyone he pleased as a witness or "oath-helper,"8 and it became
accepted that the party, in calling a witness, guaranteed his credibility and
was bound by his testimony.0 While the nature of judicial proceedings has
undergone considerable change since the adoption of the rule against direct
impeachment, there are still three principal reasons cited by the courts in
support of continued application of the rule. First, there exists the notion
that since a party is free to choose whomever he wishes as a witness, his
case must stand or fall by the testimony of that witness. 10 This concept from
its outset was clearly rejected in Missouri." Second, it is argued that in
bringing a witness before the court, the proponent is representing both
to the court and to the jury that the witness is worthy of belief and hence,
the proponent guarantees the credibility of the witness. 12 However, while
courts frequently cite this argument as the controlling reason for not allow-
ing impeachment,' 3 it appears inconsistent with the well-established practice
of allowing the proponent to introduce contradictory evidence.' 4 Finally,
.6. As to direct impeachment of an adverse party, see cases cited note 3 supra.
As to direct impeachment of other witnesses see, e.g., Humes v. Salerno, 351 S.W.2d
749 (Mo. 1961); State v. Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. 1954); Crabtree v. Kurn,
351 Mo. 628, 173 S.W.2d 851 (1943); State v. Gregory, 339 Mo. 133, 96 S.W.2d
47 (1936); Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 400 (En Banc 1935); State
v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 204 S.W. 271 (1918); Dunn v. Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597
(1885); Brown v. Wood, 19 Mo. 475 (1854).
7. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 896 (3d ed. 1940). The court, in Wells, appears
to have relied heavily upon Wigmore in modifying the rule as it applies to im-
peachment of adverse parties.
8. Id.
9. Id. See also, Thomas, The Rule Against Impeaching One's Own Wit-
ness: A Reconsideration, 31 Mo. L. REv. 364 (1966).
10. J. WxGMORE, supra note 7, at § 897.
11. Brown v. Wood, 19 Mo. 475, 476 (1854). The court held that while a
party cannot impeach his own witness because his testimony fails to establish a fact,
"the party is not precluded from showing the fact by another witness, although,
in so doing, he may show the first witness guilty of perjury." Accord, Frank v.
Wabash R.R., 295 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Mo. 1956), plaintiff is not bound by defendant's
testimony unless it is the only evidence on a particular point; Smith v. Millers
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 320 Mo. 146, 168, 6 S.W.2d 920, 926 (En Banc 1928), a party is
not absolutely bound by a witness' testimony; Rodan v. St. Louis Transit Co., 207
Mo. 392, 408, 105 S.W. 1061, 1066 (1907), "If A puts B on the stand to prove a
certain state of facts, this does not preclude A from putting C, D, or E on the stand
and proving a different state of facts.. ." Imhoff v. McArthur, 146 Mo. 371, 372, 48
S.W. 456, 457 (1898), a party is not bound by a witness' testimony, even if he calls
the other party.
12. 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 898.
13. Talley v. Bowen Constr. Co., 340 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Mo. 1960); State v.
Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Mo. 1954); Mooney v. Terminal Ry., 352 Mo. 245,
260, 176 S.W.2d 605, 611 (1944); Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 319, 85 S.W.2d
400, 410 (En Banc 1935); Gallaher v. S. Z. Shutte Lumber Co., 273 S.W. 213, 220(K.C. Mo. App. 1925); Luzzadder v. McCall, 198 S.W. 1144, 1145 (K.C. Mo. App.
1917).
14. Cases cited note 13 supra. For cases allowing contradictory evidence, see
cases cited note 11 supra.
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perhaps the most legitimate reason is that the rule protects the witness from
improper abuse by the proponent.15
The general rule against impeachment of one's own witness, however,
has not existed without exception. As early as 1885 the Missouri Supreme
Court recognized that where a party had been "entrapped" into calling
an adverse witness, he was entitled to impeach the witness by the introduc-
tion of a prior inconsistent statement. 0 This exception, however, has been
strictly limited. First, the party must show actual and reasonable surprise
at the testimony of the witness.' 7 A mere showing that the testimony was
not expected is insufficient.' 8 The party must establish to the court's satisfac-
tion not only that the testimony came without reasonable warning 9 but also
that the witness actually led the proponent to believe that the testimony
would be otherwise.20 Second, the proponent must establish that he was
damaged by the surprise testimony.2 1 The fact that the witness fails to
testify favorably for the proponent, does not testify fully as to certain mat-
ters, or has made inconsistent extra-judicial statements more favorable to
the proponent, standing alone, does not entitle the proponent to impeach
him. Rather, the witness must "go further, and by relating wholly contra-
dictory facts become in effect a witness for the adverse side."22 Thus, even
though this exception has had a long history in Missouri, the requirements
for impeachment under it are so strict that its frequency of use has been far
from overwhelming.
Although the exception to the rule against direct impeachment of
one's own witness appears to be strictly limited to situations closely ap-
proaching an intentional misrepresentation to the proponent, the proponent
does have the benefit of some favorable considerations. First, the trial judge
15. 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 899. See also Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo.
628, 647, 173 S.W.2d 851, 859 (1943).
16. Dunn v. Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597, 600 (1885).
17. State v. Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Mo. 1954); Malone v. Gardner, 362
Mo. 569, 582, 242 S.W.2d 516, 523 (En Banc 1951); Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo.
628, 646-48, 173 S.W.2d 851, 859 (1943); State v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 647, 294
S.W. 271, 276 (1918); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App.
135, 147, 112 S.W.2d 865, 872 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938); Dauber v. Josephson, 209
Mo. App. 531, 542, 237 S.W. 149, 153 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922).
18. Cases cited supra note 17; Thomas, supra note 9, at 369.
19. Malone v. Gardner, 362 Mo. 569, 582, 242 S.W.2d 516, 523 (En Banc
1951); Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 628, 647, 173 S.W.2d 851, 859 (1943); Woelfle v.
Connecticut Mut. Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 147, 112 S.W.2d 865, 872 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1938); Luzzadder v. McCall, 198 S.W. 1144, 1145 (K.C. Mo. App. 1917).
20. Malone v. Gardner, 362 Mo. 569, 582, 242 S.W.2d 516, 523 (En Banc 1951);
Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 628, 648, 173 S.W.2d 851, 859 (1943); Dunn v. Dun-
naker, 87 Mo. 597, 600 (1885); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Inc. Co., 234
Mo. App. 135, 147, 112 S.W.2d 872 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938); Dauber v. Josephson,
209 Mo. App. 531, 541, 237 S.W. 149, 153 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922); Luzzadder v. Mc-
Call, 198 S.W. 1144, 1145 (K.C. Mo. App. 1917); Spurgin Grocer Co. v. Frick, 73
Mo. App. 128, 133 (K.C. Ct. App. 1898).
21. State v. Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Mo. 1954); Crabtree v. Kurn,
351 Mo. 628, 648, 173 S.W.2d 851, 859 (1943); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 147, 112 S.W.2d 865, 872 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938); Dauber
v. Josephson, 209 Mo. App. 531, 541, 237 S.W. 149, 153 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922).
22. State v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 647, 204 S.W. 271 (1918). Accord, cases
cited supra note 21.
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has descretion in deciding whether the proponent has established a case of
entrapment, and ultimately, whether his impeaching evidence is admissible.2 3
Thus, it is entirely feasible that the trial judge might liberalize the re-
quirements for a showing of surprise and damage, particularly where the
proponent presents an effective argument. Second, where the proponent
is able to show that he was compelled to call a particular witness, either
as a matter of law or because the witness is the only person having personal
knowledge of the facts in question, the appellate courts have indicated, at
least in dicta, that the requirement of actual and reasonable surprise may
be enforced less strictly.2 4 Finally, the proponent has at his disposal a "tactic"
which, while not allowing direct impeachment, may reduce the damage
inflicted by the witness, that of refreshing the witness' memory.25 In situa-
tions where the witness' testimony is disappointing, but not sufficiently so
to warrant a claim of surprise, the proponent may be allowed to have the
witness examine his own prior inconsistent statement outside the hearing
of the jury.26 The prior inconsistent statement is not evidence in and of
itself, but its use in this manner may cause the witness to change his testi-
mony, thus avoiding the necessity of impeachment altogether.2 7
It is readily apparent that the major effect of Wells is to remove the
requirement of showing surprise and damage before a party will be per-
mitted to directly impeach his opponent when called as an adverse witness.
A careful examination of the decision, however, will reveal that its effect
is not as far-reaching as one might suppose.28
The decision is dearly limited to the impeachment of an adverse
party. By citing Wigmore, the court establishes the adverse party as a
separate category of witness to be called by the proponent. The court
points out that none of the traditional reasons for the rule against im-
peachment would be violated by the creation of this new exception. 29 Ap-
23. State v. Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Mo. 1954); Mooney v. Terminal
Ry., 352 Mo. 245, 260, 176 S.W.2d 605, 611 (1944); Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 628,
648, 173 S.W.2d 851, 859 (1943); Dauber v. Josephson, 209 Mo. App. 531, 542, 237
S.W. 149, 153 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922); Detjen v. Moerschel Brewing Co., 157 Mo.
App. 614, 617, 138 S.W. 696, 697 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911).
24. State v. Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Mo. 1954); Mooney v. Terminal
Ry., 352 Mo. 245, 260, 176 S.W.2d 605, 611 (1944).
25. State v. Gregory, 339 Mo. 133, 144, 96 S.W.2d 47, 51 (1936).
26. For a complete discussion of the problem of direct impeachment as well
as the use of this tactic to overcome unexpected and damaging testimony see,
Thomas, supra note 9, at 368.
27. Even if the court allows impeachment, the prior inconsistent statement
may not be used affirmatively to satisfy the proponent's burden of proof where
the witness is not a party. Where, however, the witness changes his testimony, the
changed testimony is substantive evidence. Thomas, supra note 9. Where the wit-
ness is the adverse party and the prior inconsistent statement is admissible as an
admission it can be admitted as substantive evidence as well. Wells v. Goforth, 443
S.W.2d 155, 160 (Mo. En Banc 1969); Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 319,
85 S.W.2d 400, 410 (En Banc 1935).
28. Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
29. 3 J. WIGMNORE, supra note 7, § 916:
If there is any situation in which any semblance of reason disappears
for the application of the rule against impeaching one's own witness, it
is when the opposing party is himself called by the first party, and is sought
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patently, the court is yet unwilling to declare these traditional reasons
meaningless. Thus, if the party is to be allowed to directly impeach any
witness other than his opponent, he must still show surprise and damage.
Moreover, even though a party may now directly impeach his opponent,
there is strict limitation as to the method of such impeachment. The court
in no way suggests that it would sanction any method of direct impeach-
ment other than by a prior inconsistent statement. In addition, most in-
consistent statements usable as a basis for impeachment of the adverse
party would be independently admissible as admissions30 making rare the
instances where the exception is needed.
In conclusion, the practical effect of Wells is little. However, a party
called as a witness now knows that if his prior statements are inconsistent
with his testimony, he will be subject to the same impeachment by his
opponent as if he had been testifying in his own behalf. The court then
has at least scrapped the fiction that when a party calls his opponent as a
witness, he vouches for his opponent's credibility.
JoHN KEAY WALLAcE, I
to be compelled to disclose under oath that truth which he knows but is
naturally unwilling to make known. To say that the first party guaran-
tees the opponent's credibility is to mock him with a false formula; he
hopes that the opponent will speak truly, but he equally perceives the
possibilities of the contrary, and he no more guarantees the other's cred-
ibility than he guarantees the truth of the other's case and the falsity of
his own. To say, furthermore, that the first party, if he could impeach at
will, holds the means of improperly coercing the other is to proceed upon
a singular interpretation of human nature and experience, and to at-
tribute a power which the former may perhaps wish that he had but cer-
tainly cannot be clothed with, by this or any other rule. There is, there-
fore, no reason why this rule should apply at all.
20. 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, §§ 897-99. See note 5 supra.
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